CLAT PG Current Affairs — 10 August 2026

The National Judicial Academy's Expert Committee, constituted pursuant to Supreme Court directions, released 2026 guidelines on combating gender stereotypes in sexual offence judgments. These guidelines build on and depart from the 2023 Handbook issued under CJI Chandrachud, refining the judicial language standards, evidentiary assumptions, and sentencing frameworks courts must apply. The 2026 guidelines introduce stricter prohibitions on stereotype-based reasoning and expand the categories of impermissible judicial conduct when adjudicating cases involving sexual violence against women.

This development sits at the intersection of judicial reform, gender equality law, and the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Article 21. The 2023 Handbook, released under then-CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, identified and catalogued stereotypical phrases courts must avoid — such as questioning a survivor's character based on clothing or delay in reporting. It was a landmark step in operationalising the non-discrimination principle within courtroom reasoning.

The 2026 NJA Expert Committee guidelines go further. Where the 2023 Handbook was largely prescriptive and illustrative, the 2026 guidelines appear to establish a structured test: courts must affirmatively demonstrate that their reasoning is free from gender-normative assumptions. This shifts the burden from merely avoiding listed phrases to actively applying a stereotype-scrutiny framework.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the key exam angle is doctrinal: what legal standard do courts apply when evaluating whether a judgment contains impermissible gender stereotyping? The examiner will likely present a passage containing judicial reasoning and ask whether it violates the guidelines, or will test the distinction between the 2023 and 2026 frameworks. The principle being tested is whether the aspirant can identify stereotypical reasoning in disguised form — not just obvious language violations but structural assumptions embedded in evidentiary analysis or credibility assessments.

The Supreme Court's 2026 half-yearly digest clarifies key rulings on BNSS Section 2(1)(k), which defines 'Inquiry', and Section 531(2)(a), the savings clause for pending CrPC proceedings. Courts distinguished purely ministerial acts from judicial inquiry. The digest consolidates how transitional provisions operate when BNSS replaced CrPC, determining which ongoing proceedings continue under old law and which migrate to BNSS — a critical distinction for procedural validity of criminal cases.

When the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1973, the transition raised a fundamental question: what happens to proceedings already underway? Section 531(2)(a) of BNSS is the savings clause — it preserves pending CrPC proceedings, allowing them to continue as if CrPC were not repealed. However, this protection is not blanket. The Supreme Court has clarified that only proceedings involving a genuine 'Inquiry' as defined under Section 2(1)(k) — meaning a judicial inquiry conducted by a Magistrate or Court — qualify for this savings protection. Purely ministerial or administrative acts (like filing paperwork or issuing summons without judicial application of mind) do not constitute 'Inquiry' and therefore do not attract the savings clause. This distinction matters enormously for CLAT PG because the examiner can present a hypothetical mid-proceeding scenario and ask whether BNSS or CrPC applies. The principle also connects to Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto criminal laws, reinforcing why procedural savings clauses are constitutionally necessary. Aspirants must know that 'investigation' (by police) and 'inquiry' (by Magistrate) are distinct — a confusion the examiner frequently exploits in distractors.

The Supreme Court in Maniyar Iliyaz v. P. Ayyappan & Ors. recognised the right to walk on footpaths as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that while street vendors have a constitutionally protected right to livelihood under Article 19(1)(g), this right cannot override pedestrians' right to use public walkways. Both rights must be balanced. Vendors encroaching on footpaths violate the fundamental right to walk, which is integral to life and personal liberty.

This judgment sits at the intersection of three constitutional provisions: Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), Article 19(1)(g) (right to practise any profession or carry on any trade), and Article 300A (right to property, relevant to vending spaces). The Court's reasoning follows the proportionality doctrine — no fundamental right is absolute, and when two rights collide, courts must balance them by examining which restriction is the least invasive while achieving a legitimate state aim.

The right to livelihood as part of Article 21 was first firmly established in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), where pavement dwellers challenged eviction. The Court held that livelihood is integral to life, but subject to procedure established by law. Street vendors' rights were later codified in the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, which mandates Town Vending Committees and designated vending zones.

Maniyar Iliyaz adds a counter-right: the pedestrian's right to walk is equally rooted in Article 21 as a component of the right to move freely and with dignity. This creates a horizontal conflict between two Article 21 claimants. The resolution lies in the regulatory framework — vendors in designated zones are protected; those encroaching on footpaths are not. The judgment reaffirms that Article 19(1)(g) rights are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) including public order and the rights of others. CLAT PG examiners frequently test the hierarchy of precedents in Article 21 expansion cases and the specific statutes governing street vending.

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 introduces Section 40A, granting victims a statutory right to be heard and assist the prosecution during bail proceedings. This marks a significant departure from CrPC 1973, which had no equivalent provision. The victim may engage an advocate, file written submissions, and present arguments opposing bail. Courts must consider victim input before deciding bail applications. This codifies victim participation rights previously recognised only in scattered case law and Supreme Court dicta.

Under the CrPC 1973 regime, victims had no explicit statutory role in bail proceedings. Their participation depended on judicial discretion and sparse precedents like Babu Singh v. State (1978) and later Puran v. Rambilas (2001), where the Supreme Court acknowledged that the prosecution's role inherently includes victim interests. The BNSS 2023 changes this structurally.

Section 40A BNSS expressly provides that a victim has the right to be heard in bail matters — whether before a Sessions Court (S.439 CrPC equivalent under BNSS S.483) or the High Court. The victim may appear through a lawyer even if the public prosecutor is already conducting the case. This is not duplicative; the victim's advocate represents a distinct private interest.

The examiner-relevant distinction is this: under CrPC, victim participation in bail was discretionary and court-driven; under BNSS, it is a justiciable statutory right. Conditions for bail under BNSS still track the earlier framework — seriousness of offence, flight risk, likelihood of tampering with evidence — but now the victim's assessment of these factors has a formal channel.

For CLAT PG, the key tension is between S.40A (victim's right) and bail conditions under BNSS S.480 (anticipatory bail) and S.483 (bail by Sessions/HC). An examiner may test whether a court can exclude a victim's lawyer despite S.40A, or what happens if the victim's submissions conflict with the prosecution's position. The constitutional anchor is Article 21 — the victim's right to a fair process is part of the same provision that protects the accused.

The Supreme Court clarified that a Sessions Court retains full power to order a joint trial even when accused persons were committed to it through separate committal orders. The committal order governs only the transfer of the case from the Magistrate to the Sessions Court — it does not control the trial's structure. The Sessions Judge independently decides, under CrPC Section 223, whether accused persons should be tried jointly or separately, regardless of how they arrived before the court.

This ruling resolves a procedural confusion that arose in multi-accused cases. When co-accused are charged at different times or through different FIRs, Magistrates may commit them to the Sessions Court through separate orders. A question arose: does each separate committal order lock the Sessions Court into holding separate trials?

The Supreme Court said no. The committal order under CrPC Section 209 is a jurisdictional instrument — it moves the case from the Magistrate (who lacks competence to try sessions-triable offences) to the Sessions Court. Its purpose is jurisdictional transfer, not trial architecture.

Once the Sessions Court receives the cases, it exercises its own independent discretion under CrPC Section 223, which governs joint trials. Section 223 permits persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction to be tried jointly. The Sessions Judge must apply Section 223's criteria — not count committal orders — to decide the trial structure.

This distinction matters enormously in practice. Joint trials prevent contradictory verdicts, reduce witness harassment, and save judicial time. Accused persons cannot weaponise procedural irregularities in committal to fragment a trial that is factually unified. The BNSS equivalent provisions (Sections 232 and 269) carry the same structural logic under the new code.

Parliament passed the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026, with Rajya Sabha approving it after Lok Sabha. The bill amends the original 2019 Act, which established self-perceived gender identity, prohibited discrimination in education, employment, and healthcare, and mandated welfare boards. The 2026 amendment strengthens enforcement mechanisms and expands protected categories. The legislation engages Articles 14, 19, and 21, and mirrors constitutional principles upheld in NALSA v. Union of India, 2014, the foundational Supreme Court ruling on transgender rights.

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 was itself rooted in the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in NALSA v. Union of India (2014), where a two-judge bench of Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and A.K. Sikri recognised transgender persons as a 'third gender' and held that Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 of the Constitution apply equally to them. The court directed the government to recognise self-identified gender without surgery or medical certification and treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward classes for reservation purposes.

The 2019 Act operationalised some of these directions but was criticised for requiring a District Magistrate's certificate to change gender — a procedural hurdle the court had rejected. The 2026 Amendment addresses these gaps.

Constitutionally, the core doctrine here is: the right to gender identity is a facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, the right to expression of gender identity is protected under Article 19(1)(a), and any discriminatory classification based solely on gender identity must pass Article 14's reasonable classification test (intelligible differentia + rational nexus). NALSA also invoked Articles 15 (non-discrimination) and 16 (equality of opportunity). For CLAT PG, the examiner will test application of these articles to new fact situations involving transgender persons' access to services, employment, or education.