CLAT PG Current Affairs — 11 August 2026

The Supreme Court has settled a dispute over exporters' entitlement to Integrated GST refunds. The Court held that exporters whose refund applications were pending before Rule 96(10) was omitted from the CGST Rules remain eligible to claim IGST refunds. Rule 96(10) previously barred exporters who had availed certain input tax credit benefits from claiming IGST refunds on exports. The ruling protects vested rights of applicants whose claims were in the pipeline when the rule was deleted.

Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules, 2017 imposed a restriction: exporters who availed benefits under certain notifications — covering advance authorisation, Export Promotion Capital Goods, and Export Oriented Units — could not simultaneously claim a refund of IGST paid on exports. This created a binary choice between two sets of benefits.

When Rule 96(10) was subsequently omitted, a controversy arose about its retrospective or prospective effect — specifically, whether exporters whose applications were already pending on the date of omission could benefit. The government's position was that the omission operated only prospectively, leaving pending applicants in limbo.

The Supreme Court's ruling resolves this by applying the settled principle that omission of a restrictive rule does not extinguish rights that had already crystallised or applications that had already accrued. The Court found that pending applicants retained their entitlement to IGST refunds.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the core doctrinal issue maps onto statutory interpretation: when a disabling provision is removed, does it operate retrospectively to cure past restrictions? The answer here is yes — pending rights survive the transition. For UPSC and NABARD, the GST architecture (IGST, CGST, SGST, input tax credit mechanics) and the refund mechanism under Section 16 of the IGST Act, 2017 are the relevant statutory anchors.

The Supreme Court dismissed TV Today Network's plea challenging a Delhi High Court order, affirming that media organisations are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held that media cannot claim immunity from High Court oversight by denying it performs a public function. The ruling confirms that when a private entity discharges a public function, constitutional courts retain jurisdiction over it. This settles a key question on the horizontal reach of writ jurisdiction beyond purely state actors.

Article 226 grants High Courts power to issue writs not just against the State under Article 12, but against 'any person or authority' performing a public function or public duty. This is a crucial distinction from Article 32, which is narrower in scope.

The foundational principle is that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 extends to private bodies when they perform functions that are public in nature — functions that would otherwise be performed by the state or that affect citizens' rights significantly. Courts have applied this in cases involving universities, clubs, stock exchanges, and now media organisations.

The test the court applies is the 'public function test': Does the body perform a function that is public in character, even if the body itself is private? The entity's legal character (private company vs. statutory body) is secondary; what matters is the nature of the function.

For CLAT PG aspirants, this reinforces the principle from earlier rulings like Praga Tools v. C.V. Imanual (1969) and Zee Telefilms v. Union of India (2005). Media, by disseminating information to the public and shaping public discourse, discharges a function with public consequences — making it subject to constitutional court review under Article 226, even if it is not 'State' under Article 12.

On 9 July 2026, a Supreme Court bench highlighted an unresolved conflict: five separate two-judge benches have delivered contradictory rulings on whether grounds of arrest must be supplied in writing to the arrested person and at what stage. No bench has referred the conflict to a larger bench for resolution. This judicial inconsistency directly affects Article 22(1) rights and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) protections, leaving trial courts and high courts without authoritative guidance on a foundational custodial safeguard.

The conflict concerns a deceptively simple question: when an individual is arrested, what exactly must police communicate — the bare legal provision under which arrest is made, or the factual grounds forming the basis of arrest — and must this be in writing?

Article 22(1) of the Constitution guarantees every arrested person the right to be informed 'as soon as may be' of the grounds of arrest. Section 50 CrPC (now Section 47 BNSS) operationalises this by requiring the arresting officer to communicate the full particulars of the offence or other grounds. Section 50A adds a duty to inform a nominated person.

The problem: five two-judge benches of the Supreme Court have interpreted the content and timing of this communication differently. Some hold that mere mention of the FIR number or section suffices; others insist on written factual grounds. Since all five were co-equal benches, none binds the other. Without a reference to a three-judge or five-judge Constitution Bench, the law remains fractured.

For CLAT PG, this matters because the examiner frequently tests the interplay between constitutional guarantees (Article 22) and procedural sections (CrPC/BNSS), asking which condition must be satisfied for a valid arrest, what happens when grounds are withheld, and whether an arrest without written grounds is void. The principle tested is: non-communication of grounds is not a mere irregularity — it strikes at the legality of the arrest itself.

Lok Sabha passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 on Monday without debate amid Opposition protests. The Bill restructures tribunal composition, tenure, and appointment mechanisms — areas the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down under Articles 14 and 21. Earlier iterations, the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance 2021 and subsequent Acts, were invalidated in Madras Bar Association cases for compromising judicial independence and executive control over tribunal appointments.

Tribunals in India derive their legitimacy from Articles 323A and 323B, inserted by the 42nd Amendment (1976), allowing Parliament to exclude jurisdiction of ordinary courts over specified disputes. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held — from S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) through L. Chandra Kumar (1997) to the Madras Bar Association quartet (2010, 2014, 2021, 2023) — that tribunals must satisfy constitutional safeguards equivalent to the courts they replace.

The core doctrinal position: tribunals exercising judicial power must be independent of executive control. The Court in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down provisions of the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Act, 2021 that gave the executive power over appointments, tenure (4-year terms were struck down as too short), and search committees dominated by government nominees. The Court applied a combined Article 14 (arbitrariness in appointment) and Article 21 (access to justice via independent adjudication) test.

The 2026 Bill enters this minefield. If it replicates the executive-dominated appointment structures or short tenures the Court has repeatedly invalidated, it faces immediate constitutional challenge. For CLAT PG aspirants, the critical principle is: legislative convenience cannot override the guarantee of an independent adjudicatory forum — judicial review under Article 32/226 cannot be ousted even by a constitutional amendment (L. Chandra Kumar).

The Supreme Court adjourned for two weeks a petition filed by Shiv Sena UBT MP Arvind Ganpat Sawant challenging the merger of rebel MPs with the Eknath Shinde-led Shiv Sena faction. The Speaker's non-appearance caused the adjournment. The case tests whether the merger of legislators meets the Tenth Schedule threshold, which requires at least two-thirds of a party's legislative strength to merge validly without inviting disqualification.

The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1985, governs anti-defection. It disqualifies a legislator who voluntarily gives up party membership or votes against party direction. Crucially, it originally recognised a 'merger' exception: if at least two-thirds of the legislature party merged with another party, members were not disqualified. The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act 2003 abolished the split exception (one-third) but retained the merger exception (two-thirds).

The Speaker is the adjudicating authority under the Tenth Schedule for state assemblies; for Parliament, it is the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of Rajya Sabha. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Schedule's validity but ruled that the Speaker's disqualification decisions are subject to judicial review. In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Court held that a Speaker facing a removal motion cannot decide disqualification petitions.

The 2022 Shiv Sena split culminated in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary (2023), where a five-judge Constitution Bench ruled that the Speaker cannot recognise a faction as the 'real party' and that the Election Commission is empowered to decide the original party symbol dispute. The current UBT petition now extends this constitutional battle to the parliamentary level, testing whether MPs who joined the Shinde faction satisfy the two-thirds merger threshold under Para 4 of the Tenth Schedule.