CLAT PG Current Affairs — 21 August 2026

On 20 August 2026, the Supreme Court quashed proceedings under Sections 3(2)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, holding that caste-based abuse hurled inside an enclosed private space, without a public witness, does not constitute an offence under the Act. The Court reaffirmed the essential ingredient that the insult must occur 'in any place within public view' — a threshold the facts of this case could not meet.

The SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted to provide a stronger legal shield than the IPC against caste-based humiliation and violence. However, the Act is not unlimited in scope. Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) — renumbered and restructured by the 2015 Amendment as 3(2)(r) and 3(1)(s) — penalise intentional insult or intimidation of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe member 'in any place within public view.'

The phrase 'within public view' is the doctrinal fulcrum. Courts have consistently held that this is not merely a procedural description but a substantive ingredient of the offence. If the abuse occurs in a purely private setting — a closed room, a residence, or any enclosed space where no member of the public is present or can witness the act — the statutory condition is not satisfied and no offence is made out under these provisions.

This ruling tracks the Supreme Court's earlier position in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab and the interpretive line from Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, where the Court read the 'public view' requirement strictly. The significance for Art. 14 and 21 jurisprudence is this: the protective legislation itself must be applied in accordance with its own textual limits; expansive application beyond the text would convert a special penal statute into an instrument of harassment, undermining the Rule of Law guarantees the Act is meant to embody.

The Supreme Court reconstituted the bench hearing review petitions against the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgment, which in 2022 upheld sweeping PMLA powers including arrest without warrant and a reversed burden of proof. Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and N.K. Singh were replaced by Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana by parties' consent. The reconstitution keeps the review alive and signals the bench will now proceed afresh on challenges to PMLA's foundational provisions.

The Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) judgment is one of the most consequential Supreme Court rulings on money-laundering law. A three-judge bench upheld nearly all of the Enforcement Directorate's extraordinary powers under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: the power to arrest without a magistrate's order (Section 19), the twin conditions for bail (Section 45), the admissibility of ED statements (Section 50), and the reversed burden of proof requiring the accused to prove innocence.

Review petitions challenging this ruling have been pending, and the bench composition has now changed by consent of parties — a procedurally important fact because it means no party objected, signalling agreement that fresh judges can re-examine the record without a fresh hearing from scratch.

For CLAT PG, the examiner treats PMLA as a static anchor: the sections, the constitutional challenges, and the Supreme Court's reasoning are tested repeatedly. The key doctrinal points the examiner extracts are: (a) whether PMLA bail conditions survive Article 21 scrutiny, (b) the 'proceeds of crime' definition and its scope, (c) the ED's power under Section 50 versus the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3), and (d) the distinction between a scheduled offence and the PMLA offence itself. The reconstitution of the bench keeps all these issues live and makes the judgment's status — upheld but under review — a testable procedural fact.

The Delhi High Court questioned the legal inconsistency that allows same-sex partners to live together and be in a relationship, yet denies them the right to give medical consent for each other during emergencies. The court noted that if the law recognises such a relationship at all, withholding the right to medical proxy consent amounts to a constitutional anomaly touching Articles 14, 19, and 21, particularly the right to life, dignity, and personal autonomy.

This case sits at the intersection of three constitutional guarantees — Article 14 (equality), Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of expression including sexual identity), and Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty including dignity and autonomy).

The Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) decriminalised consensual same-sex relations under Section 377 IPC, holding that sexual orientation is an essential attribute of identity protected under Article 21. The Court further held in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) that privacy, including decisional autonomy over intimate choices, is a fundamental right.

Medical proxy consent — the right to authorise treatment on behalf of an incapacitated person — is typically extended only to 'next of kin' under hospital protocols and statutes like the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. Same-sex partners, lacking legal recognition of marriage or civil union (the Supreme Court declined to recognise same-sex marriage in Supriyo v. Union of India, 2023), fall outside this category. The Delhi HC's observation highlights the gap: the State cannot simultaneously acknowledge a person's right to a same-sex relationship under Article 21 and then deny the practical incidents of that relationship without a compelling State interest and a proportionate means.

The proportionality test — drawn from Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) and refined in Puttaswamy — requires the court to ask: (1) Is there a legitimate aim? (2) Is the measure rationally connected to that aim? (3) Is it the least restrictive option? (4) Does it strike a fair balance between rights and public interest? The HC's query signals that denying proxy consent to same-sex partners may fail steps 3 and 4.

The Supreme Court is set to pronounce judgment on review petitions challenging its earlier ruling that mandated three years of legal practice as an eligibility condition for direct recruitment into the subordinate judiciary. The original judgment had departed from the position that fresh law graduates could directly appear for judicial service examinations. The review petitions argue the rule restricts access and conflicts with High Court recruitment rules. The verdict will directly affect thousands of law graduates aspiring to judicial service nationwide.

The controversy centres on the eligibility criteria for entry into the subordinate judiciary through the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial) or State Judicial Service examinations conducted by High Courts and State Public Service Commissions.

The Supreme Court, exercising its power under Article 235 read with Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution, supervises the subordinate judiciary. In All India Judges' Association v. Union of India (multiple rounds of litigation since 1992), the Court has repeatedly issued directions on service conditions, pay, and recruitment standards for district and subordinate court judges.

The original judgment under review held that candidates must have three years of active legal practice before becoming eligible for judicial service exams at the entry level (Civil Judge Junior Division / Judicial Magistrate). This reversed the position in several states where fresh graduates from recognised law colleges could directly apply.

The constitutional tension: Article 14 (equality) and Article 19(1)(g) (right to practise any profession) are engaged. Petitioners argue the rule creates an unreasonable restriction on fresh graduates' right to enter judicial service, while the state argues judicial competence demands demonstrated courtroom experience.

The test the Court applies is proportionality — whether the restriction bears a rational nexus to the legitimate aim of ensuring competent judges. Review jurisdiction under Article 137 allows the Court to correct an apparent error on the face of the record.

For CLAT PG aspirants, this event sits at the intersection of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 233–235, and the Court's supervisory power over the subordinate judiciary — all high-frequency testing areas.

The Supreme Court is set to decide whether a challenge to the testator's title over bequeathed property can be raised during probate proceedings, or whether probate courts are confined solely to examining the will's validity. The bench appointed Rajasthan Additional Advocate General Padmesh Mishra as amicus curiae to assist in determining whether revocation of probate is permissible on title-related grounds — a question with significant implications for succession law practice across India.

Probate is the court's certification that a will is genuine and that the executor named in it is authorised to administer the estate. Under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Sections 57, 213, 263, and 264), probate courts exercise a limited, in rem jurisdiction: they examine whether the will was validly executed, whether the testator had testamentary capacity, and whether it was free from fraud or undue influence. The doctrine of limited jurisdiction of probate courts has historically meant that title disputes — who actually owns the property bequeathed — must be resolved in a separate civil suit, not within probate proceedings.

The Supreme Court's current reference directly challenges this settled understanding. If the Court holds that title can be questioned within probate, it would dramatically expand the scope of probate jurisdiction and create a hybrid forum where both succession and property-rights questions are resolved together. Conversely, affirming the traditional limitation preserves the distinction between probate courts and civil courts of plenary jurisdiction.

For succession law under CLAT PG, this matters because examiners test the nature and limits of probate jurisdiction, the difference between a probate proceeding and a title suit, and the grounds on which probate may be revoked under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. The appointment of an amicus signals that the question is legally unsettled — exactly the kind of doctrinal tension CLAT PG examiners love to test through passage-based MCQs.