CLAT PG Current Affairs — 24 August 2026

The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-First Amendment) Bill, proposing one-third reservation for women in Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies, failed in the Lower House. Of 528 members present, 298 voted in favour and 230 against — falling short of the required two-thirds majority of 352. Speaker Om Birla announced the Bill could not proceed. Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju and Home Minister Amit Shah blamed the opposition, while Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi questioned whether the Bill genuinely empowered women.

A Constitution Amendment Bill requires a special majority under Article 368 — it must be passed by a majority of the total membership of each House and by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. This is a stricter threshold than an ordinary Bill, which only needs a simple majority of members present and voting.

The 131st Amendment Bill failed precisely at this two-thirds threshold: 298 of 528 present voted in favour, but 352 votes (two-thirds of 528) were needed. There is no provision for a joint sitting of Parliament to resolve a deadlock on a Constitution Amendment Bill — unlike ordinary legislation under Article 108, joint sittings are unavailable here.

The earlier women's reservation legislation — the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Amendment) Act, 2023, known as the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam — had successfully passed both Houses in September 2023. That Act inserted Articles 330A and 332A, reserving one-third of seats for women in Lok Sabha, state assemblies, and the Delhi assembly, but made reservation operative only after the next delimitation exercise and Census. The present 131st Amendment Bill appears to be a fresh legislative attempt, possibly to revise or accelerate the implementation conditions.

For CLAT PG and UPSC CSE, the key doctrines to anchor are: (1) the special majority requirement under Article 368; (2) the absence of joint sitting for Constitution Amendment Bills; (3) the distinction between ordinary, special, and absolute majority; and (4) the Basic Structure doctrine — courts can review amendments that damage the Constitution's basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973).

The Union government has circulated draft copies of three proposed Bills to MPs ahead of a special parliamentary session. The legislation would increase Lok Sabha seats from the current 543 to 850, triggering a major delimitation exercise. The proposals raise constitutional questions about Articles 81, 82, and 170, which govern the composition of Parliament and state legislatures. Southern states fear losing political representation due to their better population control record compared to northern states.

India's Lok Sabha seat count has been frozen at 543 since 1977, pursuant to the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, which suspended delimitation until after the first Census following 2000. The 84th Amendment (2001) extended this freeze until after the first Census following 2026. This freeze was a deliberate constitutional bargain to prevent states that successfully controlled population growth — primarily southern states — from being penalised with reduced parliamentary representation.

Article 81 of the Constitution governs the composition of the House of the People, stipulating that total seats shall not exceed 550. Importantly, this means expanding to 850 would itself require a constitutional amendment under Article 368, not merely ordinary legislation. Article 82 mandates readjustment of constituencies after each Census (delimitation), while Article 170 governs state legislative assembly composition.

The Delimitation Commission, established under the Delimitation Commission Act 2002, carries out this exercise under the superintendence of the Election Commission. Previous Delimitation Commissions were constituted in 1952, 1963, 1973, and 2002.

The constitutional tension here is acute: expanding seats requires amending Article 81 itself, which is a basic structural provision, and any formula that allocates seats strictly by population could disadvantage states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. This raises questions about federalism — itself considered part of the basic structure since Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). The examiner will test whether aspirants can identify which constitutional articles are engaged, what amendment procedure is required, and what the basic structure doctrine's relevance is.

The Supreme Court disposed of a 2015 PIL challenging delayed wage compensation under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, praising MGNREGA as doing a 'wonderful job.' The bench, led by CJI Sanjiv Khanna, granted the petitioner liberty to file a fresh plea challenging the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar Ajeevika Mission Act and its compliance with minimum wage norms, leaving the substantive compensation question unresolved but open.

MGNREGA, enacted in 2005, is a demand-driven, rights-based wage employment law guaranteeing 100 days of unskilled manual work annually to rural households. Section 3 creates a justiciable legal entitlement — not a welfare benefit — which is the constitutional distinction that makes it PIL-worthy. When wages are delayed beyond the statutory 15-day payment period, Schedule II of the Act mandates compensation at 0.05% of unpaid wages per day of delay, payable by the implementing state government. The 2015 PIL targeted non-payment of this compensation, exposing a systemic enforcement gap between the statute's promise and administrative reality.

The Court's disposal without deciding the merits, while granting liberty to challenge the new Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar Ajeevika Mission Act, signals two things examiners will probe. First, PIL maintainability: the Court treated the petition as legitimate public interest litigation because it raised a systemic grievance about a legal entitlement, not a private dispute. Second, the new Mission Act's relationship to MGNREGA — whether it dilutes minimum wage protections — is a live constitutional question. The examiner will test whether aspirants can distinguish MGNREGA's statutory guarantee from a discretionary scheme, and whether delayed-wage compensation is a right or a concession. The answer is unambiguously a right, enforceable through writ jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has ruled that a minor shortfall in Earnest Money Deposit does not invalidate an auction sale conducted under the SARFAESI Act, provided the successful bidder pays 25% of the auction price on the day of the sale itself. The court held that substantial compliance with the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is sufficient, and technical defects in EMD quantum cannot be used to unravel an otherwise valid auction sale, protecting bona fide purchasers at securitisation auctions.

This Supreme Court ruling engages a critical interface between contract law principles and statutory enforcement mechanisms under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act).

Under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 9 governs the conduct of public auctions by secured creditors. It mandates that the successful bidder deposit 25% of the bid amount on the day of the auction, with the balance payable within 15 days. The EMD (Earnest Money Deposit) functions as a pre-bid security to ensure serious participation.

The core contractual doctrine at play is substantial performance versus strict compliance. In contract law, where a party has substantially performed their obligation — here, the 25% deposit on auction day — a technical shortfall in an ancillary requirement (EMD quantum) does not entitle the other party to treat the contract as void. This mirrors the doctrine established in Hoenig v. Isaacs and applied under Section 37 of the Indian Contract Act, which recognises substantial performance of reciprocal promises.

The ruling also draws on the principle that equity will not intervene to void a sale in favour of a party (typically the defaulting borrower) who seeks to use a procedural technicality to defeat a legitimate enforcement action. The court distinguishes between conditions precedent that go to the root of the transaction and mere irregularities that do not prejudice any party substantively.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the examiner-relevant concept is the distinction between void, voidable, and merely irregular contracts — and whether a procedural non-compliance renders a securitisation sale void ab initio or simply voidable at the election of an affected party.

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that an execution court is a creature of the decree and cannot travel beyond it to grant reliefs never sought or awarded in the original proceedings. A litigant attempting to claim benefits in execution that were outside the scope of the original suit will be refused. The court's ruling reinforces the foundational civil procedure principle that the executing court must enforce the decree as it stands, neither adding to nor subtracting from its terms.

The doctrine that 'the executing court cannot go behind the decree' is one of the most tested principles in civil procedure and is directly rooted in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court's ruling restates this with clarity: the executing court is a creature of the decree — its jurisdiction is wholly derived from, and bounded by, the terms of the decree passed by the original court.

This matters because litigants sometimes attempt in execution proceedings to claim additional reliefs — mesne profits, enlarged possession, ancillary orders — that were never prayed for or adjudicated in the original suit. The SC closes that door firmly. The court enforces; it does not adjudicate afresh.

The distinction has doctrinal sharpness: the executing court can interpret ambiguities in the decree, but cannot modify, supplement, or contradict it. If the decree is silent on a relief, the executing court has no jurisdiction to grant it. The party must return to a civil court through a fresh suit or application.

For CLAT PG, this principle is inseparable from the broader themes of jurisdiction and finality — concepts that appear as passage-based and principle-application questions. The examiner often tests whether a student can distinguish between the executing court's interpretive power (narrow) and its authority to grant new reliefs (zero). The contrast between what was prayed for, what was awarded, and what is being claimed in execution is the classic three-way distinction used to frame distractors.

The Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026 INSC 899) restored a trial court acquittal that the High Court had reversed. The Court held that the High Court exceeded its limited appellate jurisdiction over acquittals by substituting its own view for the trial court's reasoned doubts about a child witness's testimony. Mere suspicion arising from the accused's explanation, the Court ruled, cannot substitute for cogent and reliable proof required to sustain a conviction.

This judgment reinforces two intersecting principles in criminal procedure that CLAT PG examiners repeatedly test.

First, the standard for reversing an acquittal in appeal is markedly higher than for reversing a conviction. Under Section 386 CrPC (Section 432 BNSS), an appellate court can reverse an acquittal, but the Supreme Court has consistently held — from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) to this ruling — that this power must be exercised only when the trial court's view is 'perverse,' 'manifestly erroneous,' or 'wholly unreasonable.' A mere difference of opinion is insufficient. The High Court must find that no reasonable court could have arrived at the acquittal on the evidence presented.

Second, the judgment clarifies the evidentiary standard in criminal trials. The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt through cogent, credible, and reliable evidence. Suspicion — even strong suspicion — cannot fill the gap left by insufficient proof. The accused's explanation under Section 313 CrPC (Section 351 BNSS) may raise inference, but an adverse inference from a weak explanation cannot substitute for the prosecution's primary burden.

The child witness dimension is also significant. Courts must assess a child witness's competency and credibility with care, but a trial court's reasoned doubts about such testimony are entitled to deference on appeal, not summary rejection.

This case sits at the intersection of appellate jurisdiction, burden of proof, and child witness credibility — three perennially tested themes in CLAT PG criminal procedure passages.