CLAT PG Current Affairs — 31 August 2026

The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-First Amendment) Bill, seeking one-third reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies, failed in the lower house. Of 528 members present, 298 voted in favour and 230 against — falling short of the required two-thirds majority of 352. Speaker Om Birla declared the bill defeated. Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju and Home Minister Amit Shah blamed the opposition, while Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi argued the bill had no real empowerment content.

A Constitutional Amendment Bill requires a special majority under Article 368 of the Constitution — it must be passed by a majority of the total membership of each House AND by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. These are two separate thresholds, both of which must be met simultaneously.

In this case, 528 members were present and voting. Two-thirds of 528 equals 352 — the required threshold. Only 298 voted in favour, a shortfall of 54 votes.

This bill is distinct from the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam (the 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2023), which was passed in the previous Parliament. That earlier act provided for one-third reservation for women but linked its operationalisation to the completion of the delimitation exercise — meaning it does not take immediate effect. Critics, including Rahul Gandhi in this debate, argue that the 2023 act was therefore hollow in practice.

The 131st Amendment Bill appears to be a fresh attempt — whether by the government or opposition — to push women's reservation into immediacy, bypassing the delimitation conditionality. Its failure in Lok Sabha renews constitutional questions around what special majority means, how it is calculated, and what distinguishes a bill that amends the Constitution from one that merely enacts ordinary legislation.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will test whether you can calculate the special majority threshold correctly and distinguish it from a simple majority or absolute majority. For UPSC, the examiner tests the Article 368 procedure and the difference between ratification-required amendments and those that do not require state ratification.

The One Hundred and Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2023 — Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam — has come into force, reserving one-third of all seats for women in the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies, including Delhi's. Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju confirmed the notification has been issued. The Act was passed by Parliament in 2023 but its implementation was delayed. PM Modi described feminine power as the hallmark of a strong India.

The Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam is the 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, inserting Articles 330A and 332A into the Constitution to mandate rotational reservation of one-third of seats for women in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies (including Delhi's NCT Assembly). The seats reserved will rotate after each delimitation exercise, meaning no single constituency is permanently reserved.

A crucial structural condition underlies the Act: the reservation will only take effect after the next delimitation exercise following the first census conducted after the Act's commencement. This means the actual reservation of seats is contingent on two prior events — a fresh census and a fresh delimitation — neither of which has yet occurred. This distinction between the Act coming into force and the reservation actually being operational is the most exam-testable nuance.

Historically, women's reservation bills were introduced multiple times — as early as 1996 — but were never passed by Parliament until 2023. The Act covers Lok Sabha, all State Assemblies, and the NCT of Delhi but does not cover the Rajya Sabha or State Legislative Councils. Within the reserved one-third, seats are also sub-reserved for SC and ST women in proportion to their existing quotas.

The Bihar Panchayat experience is often cited as a model: over 50% of elected Panchayat members are women, demonstrating that reservation creates a pipeline of women leaders over successive election cycles.

Parliament has passed the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill 2026, with Rajya Sabha granting approval. The amendment builds on the original Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019, which itself followed the landmark NALSA v. Union of India ruling of 2014. The Bill seeks to strengthen identity recognition, anti-discrimination provisions, and welfare entitlements for transgender persons. Its passage marks a legislative development directly traceable to constitutional rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The 2026 Amendment sits at the intersection of constitutional rights and social legislation, making it highly testable for CLAT PG and UPSC CSE. The parent statute — the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 — was itself a legislative response to NALSA v. Union of India (2014), where a two-judge Supreme Court bench (Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and A.K. Sikri) declared that transgender persons have a fundamental right to self-identify their gender under Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21. The court drew on international principles — particularly the Yogyakarta Principles — and held that gender identity is an intrinsic part of personal autonomy protected under Article 21.

The 2019 Act operationalised NALSA's directions but drew criticism for requiring a District Magistrate to certify gender identity, which critics argued diluted NALSA's self-identification mandate. The 2026 Amendment is expected to address these gaps, refine welfare entitlements, and strengthen anti-discrimination provisions in employment, education, and healthcare.

Constitutionally, the legislation engages Article 15 (non-discrimination), Article 16 (equality in public employment), and the state's positive obligation under Article 21 to protect dignity. It also engages Article 300A tangentially when property and livelihood rights of transgender persons are at stake.

For examiners, the doctrinal chain — NALSA → 2019 Act → 2026 Amendment — is a classic progression that tests whether aspirants can match case, right, limitation, and legislative response in sequence.

Retiring Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has called it regrettable that no legal academic has ever been appointed as a Supreme Court judge in India, despite Article 124(3)(c) of the Constitution expressly permitting such appointments. He highlighted that eminent jurists from universities remain an untapped source for judicial appointments, contrasting India's practice with other democracies where legal scholars regularly serve on apex courts. The observation renews debate over the collegium's narrow appointment pool.

Article 124(3) of the Constitution lays down three categories from which Supreme Court judges may be appointed: (a) a Judge of a High Court for at least five years, (b) an Advocate of a High Court for at least ten years, and (c) a distinguished jurist in the opinion of the President. Category (c) — the 'distinguished jurist' route — has existed since the Constitution came into force in 1950, yet has never been used in over seven decades.

This is a structural gap with significant constitutional law implications. The framers deliberately included legal academics to bring doctrinal depth and comparative constitutional thinking to the bench. In the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, legal scholars have shaped apex court jurisprudence from the bench itself.

The collegium system, as it evolved through the Three Judges Cases (SP Gupta 1981, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association 1993, and In re Special Reference 1998), effectively concentrates appointment power in the hands of the Chief Justice and four senior-most judges. Critics argue this self-referential loop perpetuates a preference for High Court judges, marginalising the 'distinguished jurist' category entirely.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the doctrinal link is Article 124 read with the collegium jurisprudence. The examiner can test: the three eligibility categories, the Three Judges Cases in sequence, and the constitutional intent behind Category (c). Justice Bhuyan's observation is a live trigger for passage-based questions on judicial appointments and the collegium's scope.

The Allahabad High Court held that no adverse inference can be drawn against an accused under Section 313 CrPC for failing to explain a circumstance that was never put to him during examination. The court reaffirmed that the examination under Section 313 is a statutory right and a fair-trial guarantee — prosecution cannot use a gap in the accused's answers against him when the prosecution itself failed to put the incriminating circumstance to the accused in the first place.

Section 313 CrPC (Section 351 BNSS) mandates that before convicting an accused, the court must examine him personally, putting every incriminating circumstance appearing in the prosecution evidence to him so he may explain it. This is not a mere procedural formality — it is a constitutional fair-trial requirement rooted in Article 21.

The principle the Allahabad High Court restates is clean: adverse inference from silence is only permissible where the accused was actually questioned about the circumstance and chose not to explain. If the prosecution omits to put a circumstance to the accused, the accused's silence on it cannot be treated as an admission or used to build guilt.

This matters because courts sometimes convict by stringing together circumstances, some of which were never put under Section 313. The ruling draws a bright line: the burden to ensure complete examination rests on the court and prosecution, not the accused.

The satellite law to know: under Section 313(3) CrPC, the accused's answers can be used in the trial but cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The accused has a right not to answer — silence itself is not an admission. Contrast this with Section 106 Evidence Act (burden on accused to explain facts especially within his knowledge), which operates independently but cannot override the Section 313 safeguard.

Key precedent: Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam (2018) SC held that omission to put material circumstances under Section 313 vitiates the trial if it causes prejudice to the accused.

The Allahabad High Court ruled that to convict under Section 396 IPC (dacoity with murder), the prosecution must first establish that dacoity was the original and primary intention, and that murder was committed in the course of committing that dacoity. A conviction cannot stand where murder is proved but the foundational offence of dacoity remains unestablished. The court acquitted accused persons where the prosecution failed to prove the dacoity component beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 396 IPC (now mirrored under the BNSS framework) creates a composite offence — dacoity with murder — and prescribes death or life imprisonment. The critical interpretive question this judgment resolves is one of sequencing and intent: which offence must be the primary one?

The Allahabad HC's ruling clarifies that dacoity is the foundational offence under Section 396. Murder is an aggravating circumstance that attaches to dacoity, not the reverse. This means the prosecution bears a two-stage burden: first, prove all five or more persons committed or attempted robbery (dacoity — Section 391 IPC); and second, prove murder was committed by any member of that gang in the course of committing that dacoity.

This is a structurally important distinction. If the prosecution proves murder but fails on the dacoity element (e.g., fewer than five persons, no robbery attempt), Section 396 cannot be invoked. The accused may still be convicted under Section 302 IPC for murder or Section 394 for voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery, but not under 396.

For CLAT PG, this matters because the examiner tests the elements of composite offences — especially which element is definitional versus aggravating. The distinction between Section 391 (dacoity), 392 (robbery), 395 (punishment for dacoity), and 396 (dacoity with murder) is a classic syllabus cluster tested through passage-based MCQs.

The Supreme Court in R. Veronica v. 2026 INSC 703 clarified that Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, which mandates proof through an attesting witness, does not apply to registered sale deeds. Registration under the Registration Act itself authenticates the document. A party challenging such a deed cannot demand attesting-witness examination as a precondition to admissibility. The ruling draws a sharp distinction between documents requiring attestation by law and those where registration serves as the authenticating mechanism.

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that a document required by law to be attested cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called to prove it. This provision applies classically to Wills (which must be attested under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act) and certain mortgage deeds under the Transfer of Property Act.

The critical distinction the Supreme Court draws in this ruling is between documents that are legally required to be attested and documents that are merely required to be registered. A registered sale deed falls in the second category. The Registration Act, 1908 mandates registration for sale deeds involving immovable property (Section 17), but registration is not the same as attestation. The Sub-Registrar's endorsement confirms execution and identity, effectively substituting for independent testimonial proof of execution.

Therefore, once a sale deed is registered, it is presumed to have been executed by the person who appears to have executed it. The party seeking to rely on it need not produce an attesting witness under Section 68. The adversarial party can still challenge authenticity, but cannot defeat the document solely by demanding attesting-witness examination.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will typically present a passage where Section 68 is quoted and then ask whether it applies to a registered gift deed, mortgage, or sale deed — testing whether the aspirant knows the attestation requirement is document-specific, not universal.

The Allahabad High Court's weekly roundup for August 24–30, 2026 covered several significant rulings. Key holdings included that a dying declaration, if found reliable and voluntary, is sufficient to sustain a conviction without corroboration. The Court also ruled on PIL maintainability standards, reaffirmed that anticipatory bail cannot be granted mechanically, and addressed whether courts can direct state action on policy matters through writ jurisdiction. These rulings collectively reinforce foundational principles in criminal, constitutional, and procedural law.

The most exam-relevant principle from this week's rulings is the evidentiary weight of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 26, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023). Indian courts have long held that a dying declaration, if the maker was in a fit state of mind and the statement was voluntary and consistent, can be the sole basis of conviction — corroboration is preferred but not mandatory. The test the court applies is: (1) Was the declarant conscious and mentally fit when the statement was made? (2) Was it free from tutoring, prompting, or imagination? (3) Is it consistent throughout? This is distinct from the general rule that evidence must be corroborated. The Allahabad HC's reiteration is significant because examiners frequently test whether aspirants understand the exception dying declarations create to the corroboration norm. On PIL maintainability, the HC reinforced the locus standi requirement — a PIL must not be used for private gain or to target a rival; the petitioner must demonstrate genuine public interest. On anticipatory bail, mechanical grant without applying the twin criteria (nature and gravity of accusation; antecedents of the accused) was disapproved. These principles connect to landmark SC rulings like Khujji v. State of M.P. (dying declaration) and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (anticipatory bail), which CLAT PG has previously tested.