CLAT PG Current Affairs — 7 August 2026

Indian courts are examining whether police can compel a suspect to unlock their smartphone, pitting Article 20(3)'s right against self-incrimination against investigative necessity. The debate intensified after the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 replaced the CrPC, retaining provisions on search and seizure without resolving the digital privacy gap. The Supreme Court's Puttaswamy ruling (2017) established privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, creating a direct constitutional conflict when law enforcement demands biometric or passcode phone access.

Article 20(3) states that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The classic interpretation covered oral testimony and documents voluntarily prepared. The Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) drew a crucial distinction: providing a physical specimen (blood sample, fingerprint, handwriting) is NOT testimonial compulsion, but compelling someone to produce incriminating information from their mind IS protected.

Smartphone unlocking sits at the intersection of both categories. A biometric unlock (fingerprint, face ID) resembles a physical specimen — courts have generally held it is not protected by 20(3). A passcode or PIN, however, is purely testimonial — it reveals the contents of the accused's mind — and is strongly protected.

The Supreme Court's K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) added a second layer: even where 20(3) does not protect, Article 21's right to privacy requires that any intrusion satisfy the three-pronged test of legality (law authorising it), legitimate aim, and proportionality.

The BNSS 2023 under Section 185 allows search of electronic devices during investigation, but does not expressly authorise compelling decryption. Courts increasingly hold that a direction to decrypt must pass both the Kathi Kalu Oghad testimonial test and the Puttaswamy proportionality test before it can be enforced.

The Supreme Court, in a bench led by Justice B V Nagarathna, ruled that no court in India can compel a woman, particularly a minor, to carry a pregnancy against her will. The judgment grounds reproductive autonomy firmly within Article 21, treating forced continuation of pregnancy as a violation of the right to life, personal liberty, and bodily integrity. This ruling strengthens the constitutional protection offered under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act framework.

This ruling is a direct extension of the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on Article 21, which has progressively expanded from mere physical existence to encompass dignity, autonomy, and bodily integrity. The foundational shift began with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which held that Article 21 cannot be read narrowly — any procedure curtailing personal liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable.

Reproductive rights as part of Article 21 gained explicit recognition in X v. Principal Secretary, Health (2022), where the Supreme Court held that unmarried women are equally entitled to safe abortion under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act (MTP Act), 1971, as amended in 2021. The MTP (Amendment) Act 2021 extended the upper gestational limit from 20 to 24 weeks for special categories including minors, rape survivors, and women with foetal abnormalities.

The present ruling reinforces that even judicial orders cannot override a woman's bodily autonomy. The court is effectively holding that Article 21 creates a negative obligation on the State and courts — neither can compel continuation of pregnancy. This connects to the nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), which unanimously held that privacy, including reproductive choices, is a fundamental right under Article 21.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the critical doctrinal point is the tripartite test from Puttaswamy: any limitation on privacy must satisfy legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality. A court order forcing pregnancy fails the proportionality prong decisively.

The Supreme Court held that a non-signatory's involvement in performing the underlying contract is a relevant factor to determine whether they are bound by an arbitration clause. The judgment extends the group of companies doctrine, allowing arbitration proceedings to rope in entities that never signed the agreement but actively participated in its execution. This ruling directly impacts commercial arbitration practice under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Section 8 and Section 11 referral proceedings.

The core doctrine here is the 'group of companies' doctrine, which the Supreme Court authoritatively settled in Cox and Kings Ltd v. SAP India Pvt Ltd (2023). The Court held that a non-signatory can be bound by an arbitration agreement if there is a clear intention of the parties, the non-signatory's active involvement in performance, and a tight corporate or commercial relationship with the signatory.

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not expressly define 'parties' to include non-signatories, but Section 7 defines an arbitration agreement broadly, and courts have interpreted 'claiming through or under' a party to extend the clause.

The key legal test is not merely corporate affiliation but actual involvement in performance — negotiating terms, supervising execution, or receiving benefits under the contract. This prevents a non-signatory from enjoying contractual benefits while escaping arbitral jurisdiction.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will test whether you can distinguish this from the privity of contract rule under Section 2(h) and Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act. Arbitration law creates a controlled exception: privity bars third-party rights in contract enforcement, but demonstrated performance involvement can pull a non-signatory into arbitral proceedings. The distinction between a 'necessary party' and a 'proper party' in arbitration also flows from this doctrine.

A Parliamentary Standing Committee has declared the current ₹1,000 minimum monthly pension under the Employees' Pension Scheme, 1995 wholly inadequate, urging urgent revision. Pensioners and trade unions are demanding ₹7,500 per month, citing rising costs of living. The panel flagged constitutional concerns under Articles 21 and 41, arguing that dignity in old age requires a meaningful pension. The EPS-95 scheme, administered by EPFO, covers organised sector workers but has not seen a substantive pension revision in years.

The Employees' Pension Scheme, 1995 (EPS-95) operates under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. It is a defined-benefit social security scheme where both employer (8.33% of wages) and the Central Government (1.16%) contribute to create a pension corpus for organised-sector workers. The current minimum pension of ₹1,000/month was last fixed in 2014.

The constitutional angle is critical for CLAT PG. Article 21 (right to life with dignity) and Article 41 (directive to secure right to work and public assistance in old age) together form the basis for arguing that an inadequate pension violates constitutional guarantees. While Article 41 is a Directive Principle and not directly enforceable, the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India has held that DPSPs must inform the interpretation of Part III rights. Thus, a pension so inadequate as to deny dignified existence can be challenged under Article 21.

Article 300A (right to property) is peripherally relevant — compulsory deductions from wages for a scheme that yields negligible returns can be examined as a property rights issue. For RBI Grade B and UPSC, the scheme's static parameters — contribution rates, eligibility (10 years of service), pensionable age (58 years), and the 1952 parent Act — are the primary test anchors.

The Supreme Court held that the 'washed-off theory' does not apply when an employer assesses whether an employee is fit to be retained in service. The doctrine — which holds that past misconduct is wiped clean after penalty — cannot shield an employee from scrutiny of their overall service record at the retention stage. The Court distinguished between punishment for a specific act and the broader fitness assessment, clarifying that employers may consider entire service conduct when deciding retention.

The 'washed-off theory' originates from service jurisprudence and holds that once a penalty is imposed for misconduct, the employee's slate is wiped clean — the past wrong cannot be used against them again. Courts applied this principle to prevent double jeopardy in disciplinary proceedings, protecting employees from being penalised twice for the same act.

However, the Supreme Court has now carved a crucial distinction: the washed-off theory applies to disciplinary punishment (i.e., you cannot impose a second penalty for the same misconduct), but it does NOT extend to fitness-for-retention assessments. When an employer or Review Committee evaluates whether a government servant should be retained or compulsorily retired under service rules (e.g., FR 56(j) or Rule 48 of CCS Pension Rules), the entirety of the service record is a legitimate consideration — including past misconduct for which penalties were already served.

Constitutionally, this engages Article 311 (protection of civil servants) and the broader framework of Articles 14 and 16 guaranteeing equality in public employment. The Court's reasoning is that compulsory retirement is not a punishment — it is an administrative decision in public interest. Since no punitive element attaches to a fitness review, the double-jeopardy logic of the washed-off theory is inapplicable. This reinforces the distinction between punitive dismissal (which must follow Article 311 procedure) and compulsory retirement (which is a policy tool to weed out inefficiency), a distinction examined repeatedly in CLAT PG passages.

The Supreme Court ruled that a Reference Court under the National Highways Act, 1956 can incidentally determine questions of title while deciding compensation entitlement. The court held that such determination is not a final adjudication of title but a necessary incidental inquiry to resolve who is entitled to receive compensation for land acquired under the Act. This ruling clarifies the jurisdictional scope of Reference Courts and protects Article 300A rights of persons whose title is disputed during highway land acquisition proceedings.

This ruling sits at the intersection of Article 300A (right to property) and the National Highways Act, 1956 (NHA). Under the NHA, when the competent authority determines compensation for acquired land, a person aggrieved may seek a reference to a Reference Court under Section 3G(5). The core question was: can the Reference Court go into title disputes, or must it confine itself to quantum of compensation?

The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of incidental jurisdiction — a court seized of a matter may determine ancillary questions necessary to decide the primary issue, even if those questions would otherwise fall outside its jurisdiction. Determining who owns the land is a precondition to determining who receives compensation. Denying the Reference Court this power would create a constitutional lacuna: a person with a valid claim could be deprived of property compensation without any forum to establish entitlement.

The Article 300A dimension is critical: no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. The Supreme Court has consistently read this to mean not just that acquisition must be lawful, but that the person must receive fair compensation through a meaningful legal process. Blocking title inquiry at the Reference Court stage would undermine this guarantee.

Note the limitation: this determination of title is incidental and not res judicata — it binds only for compensation purposes, not as a final civil court decree on title. The distinction between incidental determination and final adjudication is the precise conceptual boundary the examiner will test.

The Allahabad High Court denied relief to a former GST officer accused in a ₹2 lakh bribery trap case under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court reaffirmed that at the stage of framing charges, the court need not be satisfied of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A prima facie case based on strong and grave suspicion is sufficient. The standard applied is whether sufficient material exists to proceed to trial, not to convict.

The stage of framing charges under CrPC Section 227/228 (now BNSS Sections 250/251) is a critical procedural threshold in criminal trials. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) established a two-tier standard: if the judge finds a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, charges must be framed — it is not necessary that the judge be convinced of guilt. The judge acts not as a full trial court but as a filter against frivolous prosecutions.

The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) adds an additional layer: Section 19 requires prior sanction of the competent authority before a court takes cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant. However, once cognizance is taken and the case reaches the charge-framing stage, the 'strong suspicion' standard governs, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The examiner tests this distinction sharply: 'strong suspicion' versus 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' versus 'prima facie case.' These three standards apply at different stages — cognizance, charge framing, and conviction respectively. Candidates who conflate these stages will be trapped by distractors. The Allahabad High Court's ruling reinforces the settled principle that discharge under Section 227 CrPC is only warranted when there is no sufficient ground to proceed — not when the judge has a mere doubt about ultimate guilt.