CLAT PG Current Affairs — 11 October 2026

India's Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaced the IPC in 2024, retains the marital rape exception under Section 63, shielding husbands from rape charges if the wife is above fifteen years of age. The Supreme Court is hearing a challenge to this provision, with petitioners arguing it violates Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Delhi High Court had earlier delivered a split verdict in 2022, making Supreme Court resolution essential. No final ruling has been pronounced yet.

The marital rape exception originates from a Victorian-era doctrine — framed by English jurist Matthew Hale in 1736 — that a wife gives irrevocable consent to intercourse upon marriage. India inherited this through Section 375 of the IPC and has now re-enacted it in BNS Section 63. The exception states that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, provided she is not under fifteen, is not rape.

The constitutional challenge rests on three pillars. First, Article 14 (equality before law): the exception creates an irrational classification between married and unmarried women — both deserve equal protection of their bodily autonomy, and marital status is not a constitutionally permissible differentia for this purpose. Second, Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty): the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held that the right to privacy includes bodily integrity and sexual autonomy, rights that cannot be suspended by the institution of marriage. Third, Article 19(1)(a) dignity dimensions reinforce that silence or legal incapacity to say 'no' is not consent.

The Delhi High Court in RIT Foundation v. Union of India (2022) produced a split verdict — Justice Rajiv Shakdher held the exception unconstitutional, while Justice C. Hari Shankar upheld it, necessitating Supreme Court intervention. CLAT PG examiners consistently test whether aspirants can identify which constitutional provisions are invoked, the standard of review applied (manifest arbitrariness under Article 14 post-Shayara Bano), and the distinction between a court applying a doctrine versus striking down a statute.

The Allahabad High Court has made one lakh of its judgments available in Hindi through AI-assisted translation, marking a significant step toward accessible justice for Hindi-speaking litigants. Separately, 9,161 Supreme Court judgments were translated and furnished to the Supreme Court within roughly two and a half months by November 25, 2023. Both initiatives reflect a broader judicial push to bridge the language gap between courts and citizens who cannot read English-language rulings.

Article 348 of the Constitution mandates that proceedings in the Supreme Court and all High Courts be conducted in English, and that authoritative texts of Bills, Acts, and judgments be in English. However, Article 348(2) allows a State Governor, with the President's prior consent, to authorize use of Hindi or another official language in High Court proceedings — though judgments must still be in English unless the President consents otherwise. This creates a structural tension: the law permits regional-language use in arguments, but most judgments remain in English, inaccessible to the majority of litigants.

The Allahabad High Court's AI-assisted translation of one lakh judgments into Hindi directly addresses this gap without requiring a constitutional amendment. It is an administrative and technological solution operating within the existing legal framework. The Supreme Court's parallel effort — 9,161 judgments translated in under three months — signals institutional momentum toward multilingual access.

For CLAT PG, the relevant legal angle is Article 348 and its proviso under clause (2), the role of the Official Languages Act 1963, and the constitutional philosophy of access to justice as a component of Article 21. The initiative also connects to the National Language Policy debate and the Supreme Court's own e-Committee recommendations on vernacular judgment delivery. Examiners testing judicial reforms often pair this with questions on the e-Courts Mission Mode Project or the eCourts Phase III initiative.

The Supreme Court of India has ruled that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 belongs not only to the accused but also to victims. The Court quashed costs of ₹10,000 imposed by a High Court on victims who had approached it seeking expeditious disposal of their case. The ruling clarifies that victims are entitled to constitutional protection of timely justice and cannot be penalised for asserting that right through judicial proceedings.

The right to a speedy trial has long been established as a fundamental right flowing from Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court first recognised this in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), where prolonged undertrial detention was held to violate Article 21. Subsequently, in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992), the Court laid down multi-factor tests for determining whether delay violates the right to speedy trial, including nature of the offence, complexity, and prejudice caused.

Until now, judicial discourse on speedy trial rights predominantly centred on the accused — protecting them from indefinite detention and delayed justice. This ruling marks a doctrinal expansion: the Court holds that victims are co-holders of this constitutional entitlement. A victim's interest in seeing an offender prosecuted promptly, and in obtaining closure, is part of their Article 21 right to a dignified life.

The quashing of the ₹10,000 cost order is equally significant. Imposing costs on a victim for approaching a court to enforce a fundamental right is itself unconstitutional — it creates a chilling effect on access to justice, which is also protected under Article 21 and Article 39A (free legal aid). Courts must not use cost imposition as a tool that discourages victims from asserting constitutional rights. This case integrates victim rights into the speedy trial framework, making it a two-sided constitutional guarantee.

The Enforcement Directorate has approached the Supreme Court challenging a May 29 Delhi High Court order that quashed an FIR registered by Delhi Police's Economic Offences Wing against Newsclick founder Prabir Purkayastha. Justice Neena Bansal Krishna delivered the ruling. The ED's money-laundering case under PMLA is linked to the predicate FIR; quashing the underlying FIR directly threatens the ED's scheduled offence basis, prompting its appeal to the Supreme Court.

This case sits at the intersection of two critical criminal-law doctrines: the dependency of a PMLA prosecution on a 'scheduled offence,' and the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) to quash FIRs.

Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the ED can prosecute money laundering only if the alleged proceeds arise from a 'scheduled offence' — a predicate crime listed in the PMLA Schedule. If the predicate FIR itself is quashed, the legal foundation for the money-laundering charge collapses, because there is no longer a cognizable scheduled offence from which proceeds could have been 'generated.' This is the core vulnerability the ED is fighting.

The Delhi HC used its Section 482 CrPC power — which allows quashing of FIRs to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice — to nullify the Economic Offences Wing FIR. The ED argues that its PMLA case is an independent statutory proceeding and should survive even if the predicate FIR is quashed.

The Supreme Court has previously addressed this tension: in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022), a three-judge bench upheld the constitutional validity of PMLA's stringent provisions. However, the specific question of whether quashing a predicate FIR automatically terminates the ED case remains contested and is precisely the issue the Supreme Court must now resolve. This makes the case a live test of how independent the PMLA machinery truly is from its predicate-offence anchor.

India's Supreme Court has permitted passive euthanasia and advance medical directives through two landmark rulings: Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) and Common Cause v. Union of India (2018). The Court held that the right to die with dignity falls within Article 21. Active euthanasia remains illegal. The 2018 ruling introduced a framework for living wills, allowing terminally ill patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment in advance, subject to procedural safeguards.

Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Over decades, the Supreme Court has read this expansively to include the right to live with dignity — and, by extension, the right to die with dignity.

The journey began with P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994), where a two-judge bench held that the right to life includes the right to die, effectively decriminalising attempt to suicide under Section 309 IPC. However, the Supreme Court's five-judge constitutional bench in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) overruled P. Rathinam and held that Article 21 does not include any right to die — natural or unnatural. Gian Kaur drew a firm distinction: the right to life cannot be extended to include extinction of life.

Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) marked the next major shift. A two-judge bench permitted passive euthanasia — withdrawal of life support from patients in a persistent vegetative state — subject to High Court approval. Active euthanasia (administering a lethal substance) remained prohibited.

The constitutional position was definitively settled in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), where a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right under Article 21. Crucially, the Court upheld advance medical directives (living wills), allowing a competent adult to record their wish to refuse extraordinary medical treatment if they later become terminally ill and incapacitated. The Court also modified Aruna Shanbaug's procedural requirements for withdrawing life support.

Active euthanasia — where a doctor administers a lethal dose to end life — remains illegal in India and amounts to culpable homicide.

Chief Justice of India Surya Kant has constituted a Standing Committee on Judicial Well-Being to address the physical and mental health of judges across all levels of the Indian judiciary. The committee is a structured, permanent body — not a one-time measure — signalling institutional recognition that judicial stress and burnout require systemic attention. It marks the first formal standing committee dedicated exclusively to judge welfare at the national level.

The establishment of this committee sits at the intersection of judicial administration, institutional reform, and the growing global discourse on lawyer and judge well-being. From an exam perspective, the key concept here is the organisational structure of judicial administration in India — who controls it, and how.

The Chief Justice of India holds wide administrative powers over the Supreme Court and, by convention and coordination, over the broader Indian judiciary through the Supreme Court's supervisory role under Article 227 and the collegium system. The CJI can constitute committees, issue administrative directions, and frame rules under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. This committee is an administrative action, not a judicial one — it does not require legislative sanction.

The distinction between administrative and judicial functions of the CJI is exam-critical. The CJI acting administratively (as 'Master of the Roster,' constituting committees, allocating benches) versus the CJI sitting in a bench deciding law are two separate capacities. Courts have held — notably in Campaign for Judicial Accountability v. Union of India — that the CJI's administrative decisions are not immune from scrutiny but are subject to a different standard than judicial decisions.

For CLAT PG, the relevant angle is PIL maintainability and judicial independence: can a PIL challenge the composition or functioning of such a committee? For UPSC CSE, the angle is constitutional: what is the source of the CJI's power to constitute such a body, and where does judicial administration sit in the constitutional scheme (Articles 124, 145, 227)?