CLAT PG Current Affairs — 3 October 2026

The Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice dispute traces to a missed government deadline. A December 2015 Supreme Court order directed the Government to finalise a Memorandum of Procedure for judicial appointments in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Because that Memorandum was never finalised, ambiguity persisted over appointment protocols, eventually feeding the institutional dispute over who rightfully holds the Punjab and Haryana High Court's Chief Justice position.

The Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) is the administrative document that operationalises the collegium system of judicial appointments. Its legal foundations rest on the Second Judges Case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993) and the Third Judges Case (Presidential Reference, 1998), which together established that the CJI's primacy — and the collegium's collective opinion — binds the executive in matters of Supreme Court and High Court appointments and transfers.

After the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) — commonly called the Fourth Judges Case — a Constitution Bench directed in December 2015 that the existing MoP be revised collaboratively between the Government and the CJI. That revision was never completed.

The absence of a finalised MoP creates a procedural vacuum. When a High Court Chief Justice position falls vacant or becomes contested, there is no binding document to conclusively regulate how a name is recommended, how seniority and merit are weighed, or when government concurrence is due. This vacuum is precisely what the Punjab and Haryana dispute exposes: without a finalised MoP, both the collegium and the executive retain space to contest the legitimacy of any appointment or continuation in office.

For CLAT PG aspirants, this illustrates the difference between a constitutional right (judicial independence under Articles 124 and 217) and an administrative instrument (MoP) meant to operationalise it — and the consequences when the latter is incomplete.

The Supreme Court disapproved remarks made by a West Bengal trial court judge who, while refusing bail to an accused, appeared to offer the Supreme Court advice on when bail should be granted. The Supreme Court found such remarks improper, reaffirming the hierarchical structure of the judiciary and the principle that subordinate courts must not overstep their role by presuming to guide higher courts on the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in bail matters.

This episode touches a fundamental principle of judicial hierarchy: subordinate courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts and must not offer unsolicited guidance or 'advice' upward in the judicial chain. The power to grant bail is a discretionary jurisdiction exercised under CrPC Section 437 (by magistrates), Section 439 (by Sessions Court and High Court), and Article 136/32/226 of the Constitution at the Supreme Court level. Under BNSS 2023 (which replaced CrPC), the corresponding provisions are Sections 480, 483, and 484.

The Supreme Court has consistently held—through cases like Dataram Singh v. State of UP (2018) and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012)—that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and that courts must weigh personal liberty under Article 21 against the interests of investigation and public safety. When a trial court refuses bail with reasoning that simultaneously purports to instruct the Supreme Court, it conflates its limited jurisdiction with the apex court's plenary power. This is a breach of judicial propriety.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the key legal principle here is that bail jurisdiction is tiered: the scope of consideration widens as one moves up the hierarchy. A trial court's refusal does not bind the High Court or Supreme Court. Subordinate courts must apply the law, not define policy for superior courts. Remarks that attempt the latter are procedurally improper and judicially discouraged.