CLAT PG Current Affairs — 5 October 2026

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan of the Supreme Court acknowledged the settled position that the right to vote is not a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, yet held that any process stripping millions of citizens of their voting rights is unjustifiable and no court can condone it. This observation arose in the context of electoral roll deletions affecting large numbers of voters, highlighting the tension between statutory rights and democratic legitimacy.

The right to vote in India occupies a peculiar constitutional position. It is not a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution but is a statutory right created by the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and 1951. This distinction was firmly established in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982), where the Supreme Court held that the right to elect and to be elected is a statutory right, not a common law or fundamental right. Subsequent cases like PUCL v. Union of India (2003) reinforced that the right to vote, while not a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right under Articles 325 and 326, which mandate universal adult suffrage.

Justice Bhuyan's observation introduces an important nuance: even if voting is a statutory right, its mass deprivation can implicate Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty interpreted broadly), Article 14 (equality before law), and the basic structure doctrine — since free and fair elections are themselves part of the basic structure as held in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975).

The distinction matters enormously for CLAT PG: the examiner frequently tests whether candidates know the precise classification of the right to vote, the specific articles under which it derives constitutional protection, and the threshold at which its curtailment becomes judicially reviewable. Justice Bhuyan's formulation — that mass disenfranchisement is unjustifiable even if voting is not a fundamental right — is exactly the kind of nuanced judicial reasoning that appears as a passage and generates five application-based questions.

The Supreme Court ordered a fresh Special Investigation Team probe in the Kusumavati Gowda case, describing failures in fair investigation and evidence preservation as amounting to a constitutional emergency. The Court used the phrase 'wounded republic' to characterise India's criminal justice system when police investigation is compromised. The ruling reinforces that fair investigation is not merely a procedural right but a constitutional guarantee flowing from Articles 21 and 14 of the Indian Constitution.

This ruling sits at the intersection of two critical legal principles: the right to fair investigation as a facet of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), and the Court's supervisory power to order SIT probes when ordinary investigative machinery fails.

The 'wounded republic' language is not rhetorical flourish — it signals that the Court treated investigative failure as a structural, not merely procedural, problem. When evidence is tampered with, witnesses are not examined, or the 'golden hour' following a crime is wasted, the victim's constitutional right to justice is extinguished before a trial even begins.

The concept of 'golden hour' here refers to the critical window immediately after a crime when forensic evidence is recoverable and witnesses are available — its misuse or neglect irreversibly prejudices the case. Courts have increasingly recognised that Article 21's guarantee of life and liberty extends to the accused's right to a fair trial AND to the victim's right to an effective investigation.

The SIT mechanism is a Court-created remedy (rooted in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1998) allowing judicial oversight of investigations that ordinary police machinery cannot conduct impartially. The CrPC basis for courts to monitor investigation also flows from Sections 156 and 173, while the BNSS (successor to CrPC) retains equivalent provisions under Sections 175 and 193.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will likely present a passage stating these principles and ask the aspirant to identify the correct application — whether a fresh SIT probe is warranted, what constitutional provision is engaged, or whether evidence preservation is a fundamental right obligation.