CLAT PG Current Affairs — 6 October 2026

The Supreme Court ordered a safety audit of Delhi-NCR infrastructure while separately taking up duplicate NEET-UG scorecards as a students' rights concern in the week of 28 September to 4 October 2026. High Courts across India also delivered notable rulings touching education, safety, and administrative accountability. The week's developments span constitutional rights, regulatory oversight, and judicial review of executive action — all domains regularly tested in CLAT PG and UPSC CSE.

This weekly cluster of rulings sits at the intersection of three constitutional doctrines that are perennial CLAT PG and UPSC CSE targets.

First, the NEET-UG scorecard fraud engages Article 21 (right to education as a facet of life and dignity) read with the broader right against arbitrary State action under Article 14. The Supreme Court's consistent position since Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) and Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (1993) is that the right to education is embedded in Article 21. When fraudulent scorecards displace meritorious candidates, the Court treats it as a State failure to protect that right.

Second, the Delhi-NCR safety audit order illustrates how Article 21 has expanded to cover the right to a safe environment and safe public infrastructure. The Court has repeatedly used its Article 32 jurisdiction combined with the parens patriae doctrine to direct executive audits where life is at risk.

Third, the students' rights angle connects to Article 19(1)(g) (freedom to practise a profession) and the statutory framework of the National Medical Commission Act, 2020, which replaced the Medical Council of India and now governs NEET oversight.

For the examiner, the key doctrinal move is the Court treating an administrative irregularity — duplicate scorecards — not merely as a service matter but as a constitutional rights violation, thereby widening the scope of judicial review.

The Supreme Court appointed retired Justice R V Raveendran as sole arbitrator to resolve a commercial dispute between Kinetic Green and Saera Electric over the Mayuri brand e-rickshaw. The dispute centres on an alleged exclusive manufacturing agreement — whether Saera held sole rights to manufacture Mayuri e-rickshaws for Kinetic Green. The court's intervention to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, signals a breakdown in the parties' agreement on arbitral appointment.

This appointment illustrates Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which empowers the Supreme Court (for international arbitrations) or High Courts (for domestic ones) to appoint an arbitrator when the parties fail to do so per their agreed procedure. The court acts as an appointing authority — not to decide the merits, but to ensure the arbitral process begins.

The underlying commercial dispute involves a claim of manufacturing exclusivity — a contractual right of one party to be the sole producer of a product under a brand arrangement. Such exclusivity clauses are common in commercial licensing and joint-venture contracts and raise core contract-law questions: Was the exclusivity clause a condition or a warranty? Was there a valid, enforceable agreement? Did one party's conduct amount to breach or repudiation?

For CLAT PG purposes, the exam-relevant doctrine here spans two intersecting areas. First, arbitration law: under Section 11(6), if a party fails to act per appointment procedure, the court steps in — the arbitrator's jurisdiction flows from the agreement, not the court order. Second, contract law: exclusivity agreements raise questions of offer, acceptance, and whether a manufacturer's unilateral supply to a third party amounts to breach of an exclusive dealing covenant.

Justice Raveendran's appointment as sole arbitrator (rather than a three-member panel) is also significant — sole arbitrators are typically agreed upon or court-appointed when cost and efficiency favour a streamlined process.

The LiveLaw Business Company Law Quarterly Digest for July–September 2026 consolidates key rulings under the Companies Act 2013, including National Spot Exchange Ltd moving the Supreme Court against a High Court order refusing joint trial in CBI cases over its alleged payment crisis. The digest covers judicial interpretations of director duties, corporate governance obligations, and procedural questions under the Companies Act — material regularly tested in law and finance entrance examinations.

The Companies Act 2013 is India's primary statute governing incorporation, management, and winding up of companies. Quarterly digests from courts consolidate evolving interpretations that examiners use to frame application-based questions.

Key doctrinal areas this digest touches:

**Director Duties and Liability (Sections 149–166):** Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company, not shareholders individually. Courts have repeatedly held that a nominee or independent director cannot escape liability merely by claiming ignorance of board decisions if they attended meetings where resolutions were passed.

**NSEL Payment Crisis — Corporate Law Angle:** NSEL's insistence on a joint trial raises questions about corporate criminal liability under Section 447 (fraud) and the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil. When multiple accused persons and entities are involved in the same transaction, courts examine whether separate trials risk inconsistent findings — a procedural principle rooted in Section 223 of the CrPC (now BNSS).

**Specific Performance Post-2018 Amendment:** Under the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018, specific performance is now the general rule, not the exception, for contracts. Courts can no longer refuse it merely because monetary compensation seems adequate — a proposition directly tested in CLAT PG 2025.

**Corporate Governance:** SEBI's listing obligations overlay the Companies Act for listed entities, making governance failures simultaneously a Companies Act violation and a SEBI enforcement matter.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the examiner's pattern is to present a passage describing a corporate dispute and ask which legal proposition correctly states the director's duty or the company's liability.

The Supreme Court validated Karnataka's decision to retrospectively withdraw a sales tax exemption granted to imported sugar, ruling in Asia Sugar & Chemical Co. The court held that the state legislature competently amended the exemption notification with retrospective effect, and the importer could not claim a vested right to the exemption once the legislature acted within its constitutional powers. The ruling reaffirms that tax exemptions granted by executive notifications remain subject to legislative override.

This judgment engages two intersecting doctrines critical to indirect tax law: the nature of tax exemption notifications and the power of retrospective legislation.

Tax exemptions under sales tax or VAT statutes are typically granted through executive notifications issued under a parent statute. Courts have consistently held — from Kasinka Trading to Kothari Industrial Corporation — that such notifications do not create vested contractual rights in favour of the beneficiary. A notification is not an offer capable of acceptance under the Indian Contract Act; it is a conditional exercise of delegated legislative power that the granting authority may modify or withdraw.

The retrospectivity question is subtler. The Constitution permits legislatures to enact laws with retrospective effect in fiscal matters provided there is no violation of fundamental rights (Articles 14, 19). A retrospective withdrawal of an exemption crosses into unconstitutionality only if it is arbitrary or manifestly unjust. The Karnataka legislature's amendment satisfies the test because the legislature had the competence, the purpose was revenue protection, and the importer had no contractual assurance of continuity.

For CLAT PG, the doctrinal hook is the distinction between a statutory exemption (revocable) and a contractual promise of exemption (potentially enforceable via promissory estoppel). The examiner frequently tests whether promissory estoppel can be raised against the government when it withdraws an executive benefit — the answer is qualified: it can be raised only where a clear, unambiguous promise was made and the promisee acted to its detriment, but it cannot override a legislative amendment.

The Allahabad High Court released a Hindi-language e-booklet summarising the Supreme Court's landmark judgment in the Just Right for Children Alliance v. S. Sabharwal case, which dealt with child sexual abuse material online and obligations under the POCSO Act. The initiative aims to make the ruling accessible to Hindi-speaking stakeholders, including police, prosecutors, and the public. The booklet was released to aid implementation of the judgment's directions on reporting, removing, and prosecuting online child sexual exploitation content.

The Just Right for Children Alliance v. S. Sabharwal judgment is a landmark Supreme Court ruling on child protection law in the digital space. At its core, the judgment addresses the obligations of internet intermediaries, law enforcement agencies, and individuals under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and the Information Technology Act, 2000, with respect to Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM).

The Supreme Court held that mere possession or storage of CSAM — even without transmission — constitutes an offence under POCSO. This overturned a Madras High Court view that had acquitted an accused on the ground that he only stored such material without sharing it. The SC clarified that Section 15 of POCSO, which penalises storage of pornographic material involving children, does not require an intent to transmit or distribute — storage itself is the actus reus.

For CLAT PG, the significance lies in multiple layers: (1) the correct interpretation of Section 15 POCSO — what constitutes the offence and what mens rea is required; (2) the obligations on intermediaries and the interplay between POCSO and the IT Act; (3) the PIL maintainability question — the case arose from a civil society organisation filing a PIL, raising standing and public interest questions.

The Allahabad HC's Hindi booklet initiative reflects a broader judicial trend of vernacular outreach to improve implementation of protective legislation — itself a concept examined in PIL and access-to-justice questions.