CLAT PG Current Affairs — 10 September 2026

The Supreme Court has posted the marital rape exception challenge for final hearing, while also addressing an interim question: can a husband be prosecuted for rape of his wife before the court decides the constitutional validity of Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC? The bench indicated that prosecution may proceed even pending the constitutional verdict. Exception 2 shields a husband from rape charges unless the wife is under fifteen years of age, a provision challenged under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC (now Exception 2 to Section 63 BNS) exempts a husband from rape prosecution if his wife is above fifteen years of age. The provision originates from Victorian-era common law, specifically Matthew Hale's presumption that a wife gives irrevocable consent to intercourse upon marriage. Constitutionally, the challenge rests on three pillars. First, Article 14 — the classification of married women as a separate class incapable of being raped by their husband is argued to be arbitrary and without intelligible differentia having rational nexus to the object of the law. Second, Article 19(1)(a) and 21 — bodily autonomy, sexual autonomy, and dignity are recognised fundamental rights; the exception overrides a married woman's right to say no, violating her personhood. Third, Article 21 jurisprudence post-Puttaswamy (2017) treats privacy, including decisional and bodily privacy, as a fundamental right. The Delhi High Court had delivered a split verdict in 2022 — Justice Rajiv Shakdher held the exception unconstitutional; Justice C. Hari Shankar upheld it. The matter then went to the Supreme Court. The procedural question now settled — prosecution can proceed even before the constitutional validity is finally decided — is itself significant because it prevents the exception from functioning as a litigation shield. The BNS 2023 retains the exception, making the SC ruling prospectively critical for the new code as well.

The Supreme Court raised a pointed procedural question: can a husband be prosecuted for raping his wife when the constitutional validity of the marital rape exception under IPC Section 375 is itself pending adjudication? The court is simultaneously hearing challenges to Exception 2 of Section 375, which exempts husbands from rape charges. This creates a legal paradox — prosecutions proceed under a law whose foundational exception may be struck down or upheld, leaving accused and victims in constitutional limbo.

Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC (now mirrored in BNS Section 63) states that sexual intercourse by a husband with his wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. This exception originated in colonial-era law rooted in the 'implied consent' theory attributed to Sir Matthew Hale (1736), which held that marriage constitutes irrevocable consent to intercourse.

The constitutional challenge tests this exception against Articles 14 (equality before law), 19(1)(a) (dignity and autonomy), and 21 (right to life and personal liberty including bodily integrity). The Kerala High Court in 2021 and the Delhi High Court in 2022 delivered split verdicts — with one Delhi judge holding the exception unconstitutional and another upholding it — forcing Supreme Court intervention.

The doctrinal tension is between legislative policy (Parliament's deliberate retention of the exception despite the 172nd Law Commission Report recommending criminalisation) and constitutional morality (the court's role in striking down provisions that violate fundamental rights even if enacted by Parliament).

The SC's current question is procedurally significant: it implicates the doctrine of 'presumption of constitutionality.' Until a provision is struck down, it is valid law; prosecutions launched before a ruling may face retrospective uncertainty. This also intersects with Article 20(1) — protection against ex post facto laws — if the exception is ultimately read down rather than struck down entirely.

For CLAT PG, the key doctrinal layers are: the right to bodily integrity under Article 21 (Suchita Srivastava, 2009), the equality dimension under Article 14, and the court's power of judicial review of legislation.

The Supreme Court held that a personal guarantor is bound by the arbitration clause in the principal loan agreement even when the guarantee deed itself contains no such clause. The Court reasoned that where a guarantee is an integral part of the loan transaction and the documents form one composite arrangement, the arbitration clause travels to the guarantor under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with the nature of the guarantee under the Indian Contract Act.

This ruling engages two intersecting doctrinal areas tested heavily in CLAT PG: the law of guarantee under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the scope of arbitration agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Under Section 126 of the ICA, a contract of guarantee is a tripartite arrangement involving the surety, principal debtor, and creditor. Critically, Section 128 makes the surety's liability co-extensive with that of the principal debtor unless the contract of guarantee provides otherwise. The guarantor steps into the shoes of the principal debtor in terms of obligation.

Section 7 of the Arbitration Act defines an arbitration agreement and permits it to be incorporated by reference — meaning a separate document's arbitration clause can bind parties to a related document if the reference is clear. The Supreme Court extended this logic: where loan documents and the guarantee form one 'composite transaction,' the arbitration clause in the loan agreement is incorporated into and binding upon the guarantor, even without explicit reproduction in the guarantee deed.

The doctrine of 'composite transaction' prevents guarantors from using the technical absence of an arbitration clause in their specific document as a shield to avoid arbitration. This is consistent with the principle that a guarantee cannot confer greater rights on the surety than the principal debtor enjoys.

For CLAT PG, the examiner can test this through a passage setting up a guarantee fact-pattern, then asking which party can invoke arbitration, or whether a surety can resist an arbitral reference by pointing to the absence of an arbitration clause in their deed.

The Supreme Court flagged a systemic problem in corruption prosecutions: accused persons exploit the sheer volume of documents to delay trials indefinitely. The bench observed that mountains of records, often running into thousands of pages, make it procedurally difficult to frame charges and proceed to trial, effectively turning documentary complexity into a defence strategy. The Court called for mechanisms to streamline document handling in anti-corruption cases so that prosecutorial delay caused by voluminous records does not become a tool of acquittal by attrition.

This development sits at the intersection of criminal procedure, anti-corruption law, and the right to speedy trial under Article 21. The Supreme Court's concern is not merely administrative — it is constitutional. Prolonged trials in corruption cases implicate two competing rights: the accused's right to a fair and speedy trial, and the State's interest in effective prosecution of public-office abuse.

The core legal tension the Court is identifying is well-established in Indian jurisprudence. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002), a Constitution Bench held that no fixed period can be prescribed for trial completion, but courts must assess delay on facts. In Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009), the Court recognised that in corruption trials, delay itself can cause injustice to the public.

What makes this observation significant for exam purposes is its procedural implication under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and the CrPC/BNSS. Special courts designated under Section 3 of the PC Act are supposed to ensure expeditious trial. When records become an obstacle rather than evidence, they undermine this design.

The examiner will test whether aspirants understand: (a) which statute governs special courts for corruption trials, (b) the constitutional anchor for speedy trial, and (c) the judicial principle that delay caused by procedural complexity cannot indefinitely excuse non-prosecution. The SC's observation also connects to Law Commission recommendations on trial court reform and evidence management.