CLAT PG Current Affairs — 12 September 2026

The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down Section 147A of the Income Tax Act as unconstitutional, holding that the legislature cannot substitute its opinion for the findings of a constitutional court. The provision was introduced after courts had already ruled on reassessment procedures under the Act. The High Court ruled this amounted to legislative overreach — an impermissible attempt to nullify judicial findings through statutory amendment rather than by curing the defect the court had identified.

This ruling engages a foundational principle of Indian constitutional law: the separation of powers and the limits of legislative competence when courts have already adjudicated a matter.

The doctrine at stake is the distinction between a legislature 'removing the basis' of a judgment and a legislature 'overruling' a judgment. The Supreme Court established this distinction clearly in cases like Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) and, most authoritatively, in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014). The rule is: Parliament can always change the law prospectively, even to nullify the effect of a court ruling, but only if it removes the very legal defect the court found — it cannot simply declare the court's conclusion to be wrong.

In income tax reassessment law, Section 147 and allied provisions have a long litigated history. After courts struck down reassessment notices issued post-April 2021 under the old regime, the government enacted new provisions. Section 147A appears to have been challenged on the ground that it did not cure the constitutional infirmity — it merely attempted to reinstate the revenue's position by legislative fiat.

For CLAT PG, the key constitutional doctrine is that a legislature violates the separation of powers under Articles 50 and the basic structure when it enacts a law whose sole purpose is to make a court's binding decision ineffective without genuinely altering the underlying legal landscape. This is an Article 14 and basic structure violation.

The Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 2026 will come into force on 1st July 2026, replacing the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 — a 127-year-old colonial-era statute. The new Act modernises the legal framework governing admissibility of bankers' books as evidence in court proceedings. It recognises digital and electronic records maintained by banks, aligning evidence law with contemporary banking practices and the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 was a colonial statute that governed when and how a bank's account books could be produced as evidence in civil and criminal proceedings without requiring the bank to produce original ledgers in court. Courts could instead rely on certified copies. This was practically significant because requiring original ledgers would paralyse banking operations.

The 2026 replacement statute addresses a critical gap: the 1891 Act was drafted before electronic records existed. Modern banks maintain no paper ledgers — records are born digital. The old Act had been partially amended to include electronic records, but the framework remained patchwork.

The new Act brings three doctrinal shifts relevant to CLAT PG:

1. **Admissibility standard**: It clarifies what constitutes a 'banker's book' in the electronic age — core banking solution records, server logs, and digitally signed statements qualify.
2. **Certification requirement**: Certified copies (or electronic equivalents) signed by a responsible bank officer remain the mode of admission, but the certification process is updated for digital authentication.
3. **Relationship with the Indian Evidence Act / BSA**: The new Act operates as a lex specialis — it overrides general evidence rules for banking records specifically.

For contract law disputes — loan agreements, dishonoured cheques, bank guarantees — bankers' book entries are often the primary documentary evidence. The Act's evidentiary presumptions directly affect how commercial disputes are proved in court.