CLAT PG Current Affairs — 2 September 2026

The Kerala High Court held that kissing a child's penis constitutes 'penetrative sexual assault' under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The court reasoned that the mouth is an 'other body part' capable of applying to a child's genitalia, satisfying the statutory definition. The ruling upgrades what might otherwise be charged as aggravated sexual assault to the more serious penetrative offence, carrying a minimum ten-year sentence, and reinforces a child-protective, purposive reading of POCSO's definitional provisions.

Section 3 of the POCSO Act defines 'penetrative sexual assault' to include, among other acts, when a person applies his mouth to a child's penis, vagina, anus, or urethra. The Kerala High Court's ruling is significant because it clarifies that oral contact — specifically kissing the genitalia — falls squarely within this definition, even without conventional penile penetration.

The legal importance is two-fold. First, it resolves a potential interpretive gap: accused persons and lower courts sometimes treated such acts as merely 'sexual assault' under Section 7 (which attracts three to five years minimum), rather than 'penetrative sexual assault' under Section 3 (ten years to life). The Kerala HC shut this loophole by applying a purposive, child-protective construction.

Second, the ruling affirms that the definitional phrase 'other body part' in Section 3 must be read expansively. The mouth is an 'other body part,' and its application to a child's genitalia satisfies the statutory threshold.

For CLAT PG, this intersects with core POCSO doctrine: the distinction between Sections 3 and 7 (penetrative vs. non-penetrative assault), the role of purposive interpretation in child welfare statutes, and the court's role in applying the 'best interest of the child' principle. Examiners test whether aspirants can identify which section applies to a described factual scenario — precisely the skill this ruling sharpens.

The Supreme Court of India has ruled that no court can force a woman, particularly a minor, to carry a pregnancy against her will. The bench grounded this ruling in Article 21, affirming that bodily autonomy and reproductive choice are core components of the right to life and personal liberty. The judgment reinforces that forced pregnancy constitutes a violation of dignity and cannot be sanctioned by any judicial order, regardless of gestational age or circumstance.

This ruling sits at the intersection of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and reproductive rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has, over successive judgments, expanded Article 21 beyond mere survival to include dignity, privacy, and autonomy — and this ruling crystallises that trajectory in the specific domain of reproductive choice.

The constitutional foundation: In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench unanimously held that privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, explicitly covering bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy. The present ruling operationalises that principle — a court order compelling pregnancy continuation is itself an unconstitutional infringement of Article 21.

The MTP Act dimension: The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, as amended in 2021, permits termination up to 24 weeks for certain categories (survivors of sexual assault, minors, women with foetal abnormalities) and beyond 24 weeks by a Medical Board for substantial foetal abnormalities. The Court has consistently held that access to safe abortion under MTP is a statutory right that courts must facilitate, not obstruct.

The minor-specific angle: For minors, the intersection with the POCSO Act is critical. Sexual offences against minors result in pregnancy that the State cannot compel the minor to carry. Courts must balance the MTP Act's protections against any procedural delay that itself becomes a rights violation.

The limitation the Court recognised: The ruling does not create an absolute right to abortion at any stage without any regulation. The State retains a legitimate interest in regulating termination procedures. The test applied is whether the restriction on reproductive choice is proportionate and justified — mere passage of time caused by court delays cannot be used to deny the right.

This judgment connects directly to the CLAT PG examiner's favourite angle: applying a constitutional right to a hypothetical fact pattern involving a minor or survivor, asking whether a High Court's refusal to grant termination permission is constitutionally valid.

The Supreme Court closed a suo motu case it had initiated after an NCERT Political Science textbook chapter described corruption in the judiciary. The Court took cognisance after the chapter attracted attention, but ultimately shut the proceedings without directing NCERT to remove or modify the content. The closure signals that the Court declined to use its suo motu jurisdiction to suppress academic discussion of judicial accountability, even when the subject touched the institution itself.

This episode sits at the intersection of two foundational constitutional principles: the Supreme Court's suo motu jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article 142, and the limits of that power when it potentially conflicts with academic freedom and free expression under Article 19(1)(a).

Suo motu jurisdiction allows the Court to take cognisance of a matter without a formal petition, treating a news report, letter, or public event as a writ petition in the public interest. It is one of the most powerful instruments of judicial activism in India. However, it is also subject to self-restraint — the Court must assess whether intervening serves a genuine public interest or whether it would amount to the Court acting as a party in its own cause (nemo judex in causa sua).

The NCERT chapter discussed corruption in the judiciary as a civic education topic. The Court's decision to close the case without ordering deletion is significant: it implicitly affirms that textbook discussion of institutional shortcomings, including judicial corruption, falls within the bounds of permissible academic discourse. Ordering deletion would have raised serious questions about judicial overreach and self-interest.

For CLAT PG, the key principle is the boundary of suo motu PIL — when is it appropriate, and crucially, when must the Court step back? This case also reinforces the doctrine that courts cannot be immune from academic scrutiny. The examiner may test this through a hypothetical where a court takes suo motu cognisance of criticism directed at itself.

The Supreme Court has held that a post-conviction compromise between parties can be used to quash criminal proceedings in non-heinous offences under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS). The Court distinguished between offences that are purely private in nature and those that have a significant societal impact. Where the dispute is personal and the parties have genuinely settled, the conviction and sentence can be set aside even after trial concludes, provided the offence is not grave or heinous.

This ruling expands the practical scope of Section 482 CrPC (inherent powers of the High Court) and its BNSS equivalent, Section 528. Courts have long permitted quashing of FIRs and charge-sheets before or during trial based on compromise in compoundable and even some non-compoundable offences (following Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012). The critical doctrinal question was always: does this power survive a conviction? The answer was historically ambiguous.

The Supreme Court now clarifies that the stage of proceedings — including post-conviction — does not automatically bar the exercise of inherent powers, provided the offence falls in the non-heinous category. The key analytical test is not compoundability under Section 320 CrPC alone, but the nature of the offence: does it primarily affect the victim-complainant, or does it wound public interest so deeply that no private settlement can undo the social harm?

This distinction, first systematised in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) and reinforced in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017), creates a two-track approach. Offences like murder, rape, dacoity, and crimes against the State are categorically excluded. Minor assault, simple hurt, cheating between known parties, and matrimonial disputes sit at the other end where compromise-based quashing survives even a conviction.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the statutory architecture matters: Section 320 CrPC lists compoundable offences; Section 482 CrPC grants inherent powers; and the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 136 or writ jurisdiction under Article 226 operate as parallel routes. The BNSS equivalents are Sections 359, 528, respectively.

The Supreme Court has reserved its order on whether an accused has a statutory or constitutional right to inspect documents and evidence collected during investigation but not relied upon by the prosecution in its chargesheet. The question turns on the scope of Section 207 CrPC (Section 230 BNSS) and whether the right to a fair trial under Article 21 extends to materials the State chooses to withhold from its own case.

This case sits at the intersection of two foundational criminal procedure principles: the prosecution's disclosure obligation and the accused's fair-trial rights.

Under Section 207 CrPC (now Section 230 BNSS), a Magistrate must supply the accused — free of cost — copies of the police report, FIR, statements recorded under Section 161, confessions, and any other document on which the prosecution relies. The critical word is 'relies.' The statute, on its face, covers relied-upon documents only.

The accused's argument is that materials collected during investigation but kept out of the chargesheet may contain exculpatory evidence — evidence that could prove innocence or weaken the prosecution's case. Withholding such material, the argument goes, violates Article 21's guarantee of a fair trial and the principle against an unfair advantage by the State.

The prosecution's counter-argument is that disclosure is bounded by what it places before the court; the police case diary (Section 172 CrPC / Section 208 BNSS) is separately protected, and courts have only a limited power to direct inspection.

The broader doctrine at stake is the 'duty to disclose' versus 'adversarial system' tension. In UK and US law, unused material disclosure is a formal obligation. Indian law has been more restrictive. If the Supreme Court rules in favour of the accused, it would effectively constitutionalise a Brady-type disclosure rule — a significant shift in the balance between State secrecy in investigation and the accused's right to mount a full defence.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed a blanket ban imposed by the state government prohibiting all employees from travelling abroad without prior permission. The court held the sweeping restriction violated Article 21 of the Constitution, which encompasses the right to travel abroad as part of personal liberty. It ruled that any limitation on foreign travel must be specific, reasoned, and proportionate — not a categorical prohibition applied uniformly to an entire class of government servants.

This ruling engages a well-settled but frequently tested constitutional principle: the right to travel abroad is a component of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. The Supreme Court first recognised this in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam (1967), where a passport refusal was challenged. The constitutional bench held that travel abroad falls within 'personal liberty' under Article 21. Parliament responded by enacting the Passports Act, 1967 to provide a statutory framework, but the right itself remains constitutionally grounded.

The key doctrinal point is the proportionality test. Even a legitimate state interest — such as ensuring official availability or preventing misuse — cannot justify a blanket, non-individualised restriction. The court must find: (1) a legitimate aim, (2) a rational nexus between the restriction and the aim, (3) necessity (the least restrictive means), and (4) proportionality stricto sensu (the benefit must outweigh the harm to liberty). A 'blanket' ban fails at the third and fourth stages.

This also connects to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where the Supreme Court expanded Article 21 to require that any procedure curtailing personal liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable — not merely formally lawful. The Punjab and Haryana HC's ruling is a direct application of Maneka Gandhi's proportionality framework to service law. CLAT PG examiners regularly test whether aspirants can identify which constitutional test was applied and why a restriction fails it.

The Supreme Court ruled that a clarificatory statement made by a party before a court does not constitute a binding undertaking, and therefore its breach cannot attract contempt of court proceedings. The Court distinguished between a formal undertaking — a solemn promise recorded by the court and enforceable through its contempt jurisdiction — and a mere explanatory or clarificatory statement, which carries no such binding force. Contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked unless a clear, unambiguous undertaking was given and consciously breached.

Contempt of court in India is governed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Civil contempt, defined under Section 2(b), means wilful disobedience of a court's judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. The key operative phrase is 'undertaking given to a court.' For contempt to be attracted on the ground of breach of undertaking, three elements must be present: (1) an undertaking must have been given, (2) it must have been recorded or accepted by the court, and (3) its breach must be wilful.

This ruling sharpens what qualifies as an 'undertaking.' Courts regularly encounter situations where parties make statements to clarify their position, explain past conduct, or offer context — none of which constitute a formal promise to do or refrain from something. A clarificatory statement is informational; an undertaking is promissory. Confusing the two would allow contempt jurisdiction — which is quasi-criminal in character — to be weaponised against parties who never consciously assumed any binding obligation.

The principle connects to the broader rule that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly, and its ingredients must be strictly construed. This ruling protects parties from having explanatory conduct in court transformed retroactively into an enforceable promise. For CLAT PG aspirants, the critical distinction is the difference between Section 2(b) civil contempt and Section 2(c) criminal contempt, and the exact conditions under which each can be invoked.