CLAT PG Current Affairs — 27 September 2026

Passed in 1978 under the Janata government, the 44th Constitutional Amendment directly reversed the Emergency-era excesses of the 42nd Amendment. It tightened the National Emergency threshold, requiring cabinet advice in writing and Lok Sabha approval by two-thirds majority. Critically, it deleted the right to property from fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, relocating it as a legal right under Article 300A. It also restored the Supreme Court's power to scrutinise emergency proclamations.

The 44th Amendment is best understood as the constitutional corrective to the authoritarian excesses of the Emergency period (1975–77) institutionalised through the 42nd Amendment. Its significance spans three doctrinal areas tested in CLAT PG and UPSC CSE.

First, on National Emergency (Article 352): The amendment raised the bar for proclamation by requiring the President to act only on written advice of the Cabinet (not just the Prime Minister), mandatory approval within one month by both Houses of Parliament by special majority (two-thirds of members present and voting, plus more than half the total strength), and mandatory periodic renewal every six months. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review Emergency proclamations was explicitly restored.

Second, on the right to property: This is the most constitutionally significant change. Articles 19(1)(f) (freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of property) and Article 31 (compulsory acquisition) were deleted from Part III (Fundamental Rights). Property was relocated to Article 300A in Part XII — meaning it is now a constitutional right but not a fundamental right. The consequence: it cannot be enforced through Article 32 (Supreme Court writ jurisdiction), only through ordinary courts. Deprivation requires legal authority, not necessarily compensation (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995).

Third, the amendment restored Article 19 freedoms and Article 20/21 protections that had been curtailed, and prevented the suspension of Articles 20 and 21 even during Emergency. This directly responded to the ADM Jabalpur ruling (1976) where the Supreme Court had held that Article 21 could be suspended during Emergency — a position later overruled in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).

The Rajasthan High Court, in Jai Ram v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, directed an SDM to comply with a court order without further delay, observing that human life is short but litigation drags on indefinitely. The court warned that non-compliance would result in adverse Annual Confidential Report remarks and administrative action against the officer. The ruling highlights judicial frustration with bureaucratic inaction that forces citizens into prolonged litigation over matters an executive officer should resolve promptly.

This ruling sits at the intersection of PIL jurisprudence and judicial accountability mechanisms. The court's core concern is a persistent problem in Indian administrative law: executive officers ignore or indefinitely delay compliance with judicial orders, effectively nullifying rights already adjudicated in court. The Rajasthan HC's remedy here is instructive — rather than contempt proceedings alone, the court deployed the threat of adverse ACR entries, which directly affect an officer's promotion, career progression, and service record under state service rules.

The observation 'man lives short but litigation continues infinitely' captures the human cost of systemic delay. Courts have increasingly recognised that a right without enforcement is no right at all — a principle rooted in Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) which includes the right to a speedy resolution of legal claims.

For CLAT PG, what matters is the principle the court is enforcing: judicial orders create enforceable obligations on state officers, and courts have inherent power under Article 215 (High Courts as courts of record) and contempt jurisdiction to compel compliance. The ACR-linked sanction is a softer but operationally potent tool — courts have used it in PIL contexts, especially in cases involving welfare rights and land disputes where beneficiaries are elderly or vulnerable. This case also reinforces that locus standi in PIL is irrelevant when the petitioner is the aggrieved party themselves; the maintainability question dissolves when a specific right-holder approaches the court.