CLAT PG Current Affairs — 29 September 2026

The Supreme Court has stayed a Delhi High Court judgment that upheld a GST department search conducted at an advocate's office. The High Court had ruled the search valid under GST law. The Supreme Court's stay signals serious concern about whether such searches violate the constitutional right to privacy and professional privilege protecting lawyer-client communications. The matter raises a direct conflict between the state's tax-enforcement power and the fundamental rights of legal professionals under Articles 19 and 21.

This case sits at the intersection of three constitutional doctrines that CLAT PG repeatedly tests: the right to privacy under Article 21, professional privilege as a subset of that right, and the limits of state-coercive power under tax statutes.

After the Supreme Court's nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held privacy to be a fundamental right under Article 21, the question of whether state agencies can conduct searches of professional premises — especially lawyers — without robust safeguards became constitutionally live. The court in Puttaswamy applied a three-part test: legality (a law must authorise the action), necessity (it must serve a legitimate state aim), and proportionality (the means must not exceed what is required).

An advocate's office carries an additional layer of protection: lawyer-client privilege, which is a rule of evidence (Section 126, Indian Evidence Act) but also derives constitutional shelter from Article 19(1)(g) (right to practise any profession) and Article 21 (right to a fair trial, which implies confidential legal advice). A GST search that sweeps through case files, communications, and client documents may violate this privilege even if the GST Act's search provisions are otherwise valid.

The Delhi High Court upheld the search, treating the GST statutory framework as sufficient authorisation. The Supreme Court's stay suggests the proportionality prong was not adequately examined — i.e., whether less intrusive means existed, and whether client-privileged documents were shielded during the search. For aspirants, the doctrinal question is: can a general tax-enforcement power override a constitutionally protected professional relationship? The answer turns on Puttaswamy's proportionality test.

The Supreme Court dismissed a PIL seeking a court-monitored probe into alleged routing and rerouting of funds through overseas entities into Indian equity markets linked to the Adani Group. The bench found no credible material to justify ordering an investigation beyond what regulatory agencies already oversee. The dismissal reinforces the Court's consistent position that PILs must present concrete, verifiable grounds before judicial intervention in ongoing regulatory or market matters is warranted.

This dismissal is a textbook application of the Supreme Court's PIL maintainability filter. The Court has, through a line of decisions, distinguished genuine public interest litigation from what it terms 'publicity interest litigation' or fishing expeditions. The test applied is whether the petitioner has placed before the Court credible, specific, and verifiable material that prima facie establishes a failure or inaction by the competent regulatory authority — here, SEBI and enforcement agencies already examining Adani-related allegations.

When that threshold is not met, the Court refuses to convert itself into an investigative body. This principle matters because PILs are a constitutional tool under Articles 32 and 226 — they lower the locus standi barrier so any public-spirited person can approach the Court on behalf of those who cannot. But lowered locus standi does not mean absent scrutiny. The Court retains inherent power to dismiss at the threshold if the petition lacks prima facie merit or is motivated by interests other than genuine public concern.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the operative legal concepts are: (1) locus standi relaxation in PILs; (2) the credible material threshold for directing an investigation; (3) separation of powers — courts do not supervise regulators absent demonstrated failure; and (4) SEBI's statutory jurisdiction over market manipulation and foreign fund routing under the SEBI Act, 1992 and FEMA, 1999. The Adani context is the vehicle; the PIL maintainability doctrine is the examinable principle.

The Securities Appellate Tribunal disposed of appeals filed by five foreign portfolio investors named in the Hindenburg Research report against Adani Group. The FPIs had argued that SEBI rules require the adjudicating officer to first form an opinion on whether a formal inquiry should be held before proceeding. SAT's disposal of the appeals closes this procedural challenge, though the underlying SEBI investigation into the FPIs' alleged role in the Adani matter continues separately.

This case sits at the intersection of SEBI's adjudication procedure and the rights of regulated entities to challenge that procedure before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT).

Under the SEBI (Procedure for Holding Inquiry and Imposing Penalties) Rules, 1995, an adjudicating officer appointed by SEBI must follow a prescribed sequence before imposing penalties. The FPIs' core argument was that the adjudicating officer is obligated to form a prior opinion on whether a formal inquiry is even warranted — a threshold gatekeeping step — before issuing show-cause notices or proceeding further. Skipping this step, they argued, vitiates the entire proceeding.

SAT is a statutory appellate body created under Section 15K of the SEBI Act, 1992. It hears appeals against SEBI orders and has jurisdiction to set aside, modify, or confirm orders. When SAT 'disposes of' an appeal, it may do so on merits, on procedural grounds, or by remanding the matter — the specific ground here matters for the investigation's future trajectory.

The Hindenburg context is significant: in January 2023, Hindenburg Research alleged that certain FPIs were used to route funds into Adani Group entities in violation of minimum public shareholding norms. SEBI's subsequent investigation identified these five FPIs as persons of interest. Their procedural challenge before SAT was a defence tactic to delay or invalidate the adjudication process itself — a common strategy in complex securities enforcement.

The Supreme Court refused to interfere with a Calcutta High Court judgment that upheld a ₹14.49 crore arbitral award arising from a commercial dispute involving cricketer Sourav Ganguly and Percept Talent Management Ltd. Percept had challenged the High Court's decision, but the Supreme Court declined to entertain the petition, leaving the arbitral award intact. The case touches on the limited scope of judicial review of arbitral awards under Indian arbitration law.

This case sits at the intersection of sports management contracts and arbitration law — a combination increasingly tested in CLAT PG. The core legal principle at stake is the extremely narrow window through which courts may interfere with arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Under Section 34, a court may set aside an award only on specific grounds: incapacity of a party, invalidity of the arbitration agreement, denial of proper notice, the award going beyond the scope of submission, or the award conflicting with public policy of India. Section 37 provides a limited appellate remedy. The Supreme Court's refusal to entertain Percept's challenge reinforces the pro-arbitration stance Indian courts have consistently adopted post the 2015 and 2019 amendments to the Act.

The 'public policy' ground, narrowed by the Supreme Court in ONGC v. Saw Pipes (2003) and further refined in Associate Builders v. DDA (2015), means courts cannot re-examine the merits of a dispute just because they would have decided it differently. Patent illegality — apparent on the face of the award — is the only merits-based ground available for domestic awards, and even that is read restrictively.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the key doctrinal point is that arbitration finality is near-absolute: a party that loses an arbitration cannot use courts as a second attempt at the merits. The examiner routinely tests whether aspirants can identify which grounds legitimately trigger Section 34 interference and which do not.

The Supreme Court Collegium has recommended the elevation of three sitting High Court Chief Justices as judges of the Supreme Court. The recommendation, made by the five-senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, follows the collegium system established through the Three Judges Cases. The names now move to the government for formal appointment. This development is significant for judicial appointments and the ongoing debate around the collegium's role in shaping the composition of India's apex court.

The collegium system governs judicial appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts in India. It is not found in the Constitution's text but was judicially crafted through three landmark Supreme Court decisions collectively called the Three Judges Cases.

First Judges Case (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981): The Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice of India's opinion on judicial appointments was not binding on the executive, giving primacy to the government.

Second Judges Case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993): The Court reversed the First Judges Case and held that the 'opinion' of the CJI — formed in consultation with the two senior-most judges — was binding. This established the collegium system.

Third Judges Case (In re: Special Reference 1 of 1998): On a Presidential Reference, the Court expanded the collegium to the CJI plus the four senior-most puisne judges of the Supreme Court. This is the current binding position.

For elevation to the Supreme Court, Article 124(2) of the Constitution requires the President to appoint judges 'after consultation' with the CJI and such other judges as the President thinks necessary. The collegium's interpretation renders this 'consultation' effectively binding. The government can return a recommendation once, but if the collegium reiterates it, the appointment must be made.

The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), enacted by the 99th Constitutional Amendment (2014), sought to replace the collegium with a statutory body but was struck down in 2015 (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India) as unconstitutional for violating judicial independence, a basic structure element.