The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a High Court can issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 to quash a tribunal decision that is grossly perverse — meaning one that no reasonable person could have reached on the facts and law available. The Court distinguished this ground from a mere error within jurisdiction, clarifying that perversity so extreme as to shock judicial conscience crosses into an error of jurisdiction and thus falls within the High Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction.

Certiorari is a writ by which a superior court calls up the record of a proceeding before a lower court or tribunal to examine whether it has acted within its jurisdiction, followed the principles of natural justice, and not committed an error apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226, High Courts have broader certiorari powers than the Supreme Court under Article 32, because Article 226 is not confined to fundamental rights enforcement — it extends to 'any other purpose.'

The classic English law position, adopted in India through Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (1955), holds that certiorari lies for: (1) want of jurisdiction, (2) excess of jurisdiction, (3) error of law apparent on the face of the record, and (4) breach of natural justice. 'Gross perversity' was later recognised as a sub-category — where a finding is so irrational that it effectively amounts to an excess or abuse of jurisdiction.

The critical distinction the Court is drawing in this ruling is between a mere wrong decision (which is not open to certiorari because an error within jurisdiction does not oust jurisdiction) and a decision so perverse that no tribunal acting reasonably could have reached it. The latter collapses into jurisdictional error, making certiorari available.

This doctrine connects to the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard in administrative law and aligns with the Supreme Court's consistent position in cases like Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003), where it held that High Courts may use Article 226/227 to correct a palpably erroneous or perverse subordinate court/tribunal order. The ruling thus reinforces that judicial review of tribunals, while limited, is not excluded when the decision shocks the judicial conscience.