The Delhi High Court granted bail to Mohammad Saqib, an alleged member of a pro-Islamic State terror module, after he had spent approximately eight years in custody under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The court considered evidence recorded after the trial court had rejected his bail application, concluding that remitting him to file a fresh bail application at the trial court level would be unjust given the circumstances and prolonged incarceration.

This case sits at the intersection of UAPA's stringent bail conditions and the constitutional right to personal liberty under Article 21. Under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, bail cannot be granted if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or report, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true. This is a significantly higher threshold than ordinary bail under CrPC Section 437 or 439 (now BNSS Sections 480 and 483).

The Supreme Court in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) held that at the bail stage under UAPA, courts cannot hold a mini-trial or weigh evidence meticulously — the standard is a broad probabilistic view of the material on record. However, the Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) clarified that even under special statutes like UAPA, prolonged incarceration that violates Article 21 can justify bail, and statutory restrictions do not completely override constitutional rights.

The Delhi HC's reasoning here — that evidence recorded after the trial court's bail rejection should be freshly considered at the appellate stage rather than forcing a remand — reflects the principle that appellate courts can exercise original bail jurisdiction when remand would cause further injustice. This is the doctrinal tension CLAT PG loves to test: the interplay between statutory restrictions on bail under special laws and the residual constitutional power of superior courts.