The Supreme Court of India granted bail to two Muslim men who had spent nearly twelve years in custody under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The case highlights UAPA's stringent bail conditions under Section 43D(5), which prohibits bail if the court finds prima facie truth in the accusations. The Court, applying the liberty-restrictive threshold carefully, ruled that continued incarceration without trial conclusion violated fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

This case sits at the intersection of UAPA's special bail bar and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty. Under ordinary CrPC/BNSS bail law, courts balance flight risk, evidence tampering, and public safety. UAPA Section 43D(5) imposes an additional statutory bar: bail cannot be granted if the Public Prosecutor opposes and the court finds prima facie that the accusations are true on the basis of the case diary or chargesheet.

However, the Supreme Court has progressively carved out an exception: where trial is indefinitely delayed and the accused has spent a period equivalent to or exceeding the minimum sentence, continued detention becomes punitive rather than preventive, violating Article 21. This is the 'default bail on liberty grounds' principle — distinct from default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC/Section 187 BNSS for failure to file chargesheet within 60/90 days.

The examiner will test: (1) the exact threshold under Section 43D(5) UAPA — 'prima facie true' — which is stricter than the ordinary 'reasonable grounds for believing guilt'; (2) the distinction between Section 167(2) default bail (indefeasible right) and bail on merits under UAPA; (3) that even under UAPA, Article 21 can override the statutory bar in cases of prolonged incarceration without trial — as held in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) where the Supreme Court held UAPA bail bar does not negate constitutional courts' power to grant bail when trial is unduly delayed.