The Supreme Court has cautioned High Courts against routinely staying criminal trials by mechanically invoking their revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC (Section 442 BNSS). The Court held that stays on trial proceedings should be an exception, not a norm, and must be justified by exceptional circumstances. Granting such stays without applying judicial mind defeats the constitutional mandate of speedy trial under Article 21 and causes prolonged hardship to complainants and witnesses waiting for justice.

This ruling engages two intersecting doctrines in criminal procedure: the scope of revisional jurisdiction and the right to a speedy trial.

Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC (now Section 442 BNSS) allows the High Court or Sessions Court to call for and examine the record of any inferior court to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality, or propriety of a finding, sentence, or order. It is a supervisory, not appellate, power. The critical distinction is that revision does not automatically carry a right to stay proceedings — a stay is a discretionary equitable relief that must be earned.

The Supreme Court's concern is 'mechanical invocation' — High Courts issuing stay orders almost as a matter of course whenever a revision petition is filed, without examining whether exceptional circumstances exist. This converts a supervisory remedy into a delaying tactic. In Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of UP (2012), the Supreme Court had already flagged the pendency crisis arising from such stays.

The constitutional anchor is Article 21: the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to a speedy trial (Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, 1979). A mechanically-granted stay of trial violates this right not just of the accused, but also of the victim and witnesses.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will test whether you can distinguish revisional jurisdiction from appellate jurisdiction, identify when a stay of trial is permissible, and apply the speedy trial doctrine to a new fact pattern.