The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on two structural questions about the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: whether it can function as a single-member bench, and whether it must include a judicial member. The authority exercises quasi-judicial powers to confirm or revoke attachments of proceeds of crime. The bench heard arguments on whether its composition, as currently practised, satisfies constitutional requirements of fair adjudication and judicial oversight.

The PMLA Adjudicating Authority is the body that decides whether provisional attachment of property — ordered by the Enforcement Directorate — should be confirmed. Under Section 8 of PMLA, the Authority must adjudicate within 180 days. This is not a criminal court but a quasi-judicial tribunal with serious civil consequences: it can permanently freeze and eventually forfeit property worth crores.

The constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court raises two related but distinct issues. First, can a single-member bench of the Authority validly adjudicate, or does the statute require a multi-member composition? Second, must at least one member be a judicial member — that is, someone with judicial training or experience — as opposed to a bureaucrat or executive appointee?

This connects to a broader principle the Supreme Court has developed across several cases: where a tribunal exercises powers that directly affect life, liberty, or property, the constitution of that tribunal must satisfy minimum standards of independence. The landmark ruling in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down the Tribunal Reforms Act provisions that curtailed judicial independence in tribunals. Similarly, in Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019), the Court held that the composition of tribunals cannot be left entirely to executive discretion.

For PMLA specifically, the stakes are high because the Act already shifts the burden of proof onto the accused (Section 24), and the Adjudicating Authority is the first institutional check on ED's attachment power. If the Authority lacks judicial character, the entire attachment mechanism becomes constitutionally suspect.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the key principle is that quasi-judicial tribunals affecting property rights must have an independent and judicially trained composition — this is not just a statutory question but a constitutional one rooted in Articles 14 and 21.