The Supreme Court upheld a High Court judgment holding that offering a 'dua' (prayer) seeking God's blessings for electoral victory does not amount to soliciting votes on the ground of religion under Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court distinguished between a personal religious expression and a corrupt practice of appealing to voters on religious grounds, reinforcing that intent and direct appeal to voters are essential ingredients of the corrupt practice provision.

Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 defines a 'corrupt practice' as an appeal by a candidate or their agent to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of religion, race, caste, community, or language. The Supreme Court's ruling draws a critical line between two very different acts: a private or public prayer invoking divine blessing for a candidate's success, and a direct appeal to voters asking them to vote on religious grounds.

The distinction matters constitutionally. Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression, and Article 25 protects freedom of religion. A candidate uttering a prayer is exercising both rights. However, Section 123(3) curtails this freedom when the religious expression is instrumentalised as a tool to solicit votes — i.e., when the religious act is directed at the electorate with the purpose of influencing their vote on religious grounds.

The Court's reasoning follows the test laid down in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), where a seven-judge constitutional bench held that 'his' in Section 123(3) refers not just to the candidate's religion but to anyone's religion — making any religious appeal in election campaigning a corrupt practice. However, that ruling also implicitly required a direct nexus between the religious appeal and the solicitation of votes. A dua, offered as a spiritual expression rather than a voter-directed campaign tool, lacks that nexus. Thus, the two essential ingredients — a direct appeal and an intent to solicit votes on religious grounds — were absent, and the corrupt practice charge could not sustain.