The Supreme Court has reiterated that an appellate court should not routinely remand a case to the trial court merely because the trial court omitted to decide a particular issue. If the evidence on record is sufficient for the appellate court to resolve the omitted issue itself, it must do so rather than send the matter back. Routine remand causes unnecessary delay and defeats the purpose of appellate jurisdiction as a final corrective mechanism.

This ruling reinforces a foundational principle of appellate procedure embedded in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order XLI Rule 23A of the CPC specifically empowers an appellate court to determine an issue omitted by the trial court, provided the evidence already on record is adequate. Remand is an exception — not a default remedy — and is warranted only when fresh evidence is genuinely needed or the missing finding cannot be inferred from existing material.

The Supreme Court's reiteration matters because lower courts and High Courts have historically used remand as a convenient escape from resolving hard questions of law or fact. The Court has consistently held that this amounts to an abdication of appellate duty. The principle traces back to decisions like Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) and Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath (1987), where the Court drew a sharp distinction between remand for want of evidence versus remand for want of analysis.

For CLAT PG, this sits at the intersection of civil procedure and appellate jurisdiction — two areas the examiner treats as high-yield. The key conceptual triangle to hold in mind is: (1) appellate courts have full power to evaluate evidence; (2) remand is justified only when fresh evidence is necessary; (3) delay caused by unjustified remand is itself a ground for appellate intervention. Order XLI Rule 25 is the complementary provision — it allows an appellate court to frame and try an issue itself before deciding the appeal.