The Supreme Court has clarified that the 45-day limitation period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code begins from the date NCLAT pronounces its order, not from when the appellant receives a certified copy. The ruling settles a recurring dispute about when time starts running under IBC's strict limitation framework, reaffirming that pronouncement — not service — triggers the countdown for aggrieved parties.

Section 62 of the IBC allows an appeal to the Supreme Court against any NCLAT order, but only within 45 days of that order. The critical question this ruling resolves is: does the clock start when NCLAT announces its decision in open court, or only when the affected party receives an authenticated certified copy?

The Supreme Court held that the limitation period runs from the date of pronouncement. This aligns IBC with the general principle under the Limitation Act, 1963, and mirrors how limitation is computed under the Civil Procedure Code — the right to appeal accrues when the order is made, not when the aggrieved party learns its full text.

The practical significance is sharp. IBC proceedings are deliberately time-bound — the entire resolution framework is designed to avoid delay. Allowing the clock to start only upon certified copy receipt would create an easily manipulated, indefinitely extendable starting point. The Court's interpretation closes that gap.

For CLAT PG aspirants, this intersects with two tested concepts: (1) statutory interpretation of limitation clauses in special legislation, and (2) the relationship between general limitation law and IBC's self-contained scheme. The examiner typically frames questions around which event triggers limitation — a distinction between 'pronouncement,' 'communication,' and 'knowledge' that CLAT PG has tested repeatedly in analogous contexts.