The Supreme Court set aside orders by a trial court and High Court that had rejected a Waqf trust's objection to execution of a property decree. The trust had raised objections under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC, claiming the property was Waqf property protected under Article 300A. The Court held that these objections deserved a fresh inquiry and could not be dismissed summarily, remanding the matter for reconsideration with proper hearing of the trust's claim.

This case sits at the intersection of two important constitutional and statutory domains: Article 300A (right to property) and the special protective regime for Waqf properties under the Waqf Act, 1995.

Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of their property save by authority of law. The Supreme Court has progressively interpreted this to mean not just that a law must exist, but that it must be fair, just, and non-arbitrary. Critically, courts have held that provisions seeking to divest a person of property rights must be strictly construed — the principle established in cases like Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. (2020).

In execution proceedings, Order XXI Rule 97 CPC allows a third party whose possession is disturbed by execution to raise an objection. A Waqf trust claiming ownership over the property being executed is precisely such a third party. The executing court cannot brush aside such objections without inquiry — doing so amounts to depriving the trust of property without due process, violating Article 300A.

The Waqf Act, 1995 adds a further layer: Section 85 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Waqf Tribunal for disputes relating to Waqf property. The interplay between CPC execution machinery and the Waqf Tribunal's jurisdiction is a recurring doctrinal tension that examiners exploit.

The deeper principle is that Article 300A is not merely a procedural guarantee — it carries a substantive component requiring a fair hearing before any deprivation, even in execution proceedings against third parties.