The Supreme Court ruled that witness testimony recorded during trial against one accused cannot be used against a co-accused who had absconded, unless a specific order under Section 299 CrPC was passed before recording such evidence. The court clarified that mere abscondence does not automatically attract S.299 protections. A deliberate judicial order designating the accused as an absconder and directing evidence to be recorded in their absence is a mandatory procedural prerequisite for such evidence to be later admissible against them.

Section 299 CrPC (now mirrored under BNSS) creates a narrow exception to the fundamental right of an accused to be present during trial and cross-examine witnesses. Ordinarily, evidence recorded in the absence of an accused is inadmissible against them — this flows from the principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution.

S.299 permits a court to record evidence against an absconder if: (1) a warrant has been issued, (2) the accused cannot be found, and (3) a specific judicial order is passed directing that evidence be recorded in their absence. This evidence, once recorded under a valid S.299 order, can later be used against the accused when they are eventually apprehended and face trial.

The Supreme Court's ruling tightens this framework significantly: courts cannot retrospectively validate evidence by invoking S.299. The order must precede the recording of evidence. If evidence was recorded without such an order — even if the accused was factually absconding — it cannot be used against them later.

This matters because the examiner will distinguish between the factual state of abscondence and the legal procedural requirement. A co-accused who was simply absent but not formally designated under a S.299 order retains full evidentiary protections. This is the classic CLAT PG trap: equating factual absence with legal abscondence.