UPSC CSE Current Affairs — 28 August 2026

The Supreme Court, through Justices B V Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, permitted a 15-year-old girl to terminate a pregnancy exceeding seven months. The Court held that no court can compel a woman, especially a minor, to continue a pregnancy against her will. Reproductive autonomy was declared an integral part of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21. The Court rejected the adoption alternative argument and warned that denial of relief risks driving individuals toward unsafe, illegal abortions.

This ruling deepens the constitutional architecture around Article 21 by recognising reproductive autonomy as a fundamental right, not merely a statutory benefit under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act, 1971.

The MTP Act permits termination up to 20 weeks on general grounds and up to 24 weeks for special categories (including minors and survivors of sexual assault) under the 2021 amendment. Beyond 24 weeks, termination requires a Medical Board opinion and court intervention. This case involved a pregnancy beyond seven months, making court approval essential — and the Supreme Court's reasoning therefore goes beyond the statute.

Constitutionally, the judgment sits at the intersection of three recognised rights under Article 21: the right to privacy (K.S. Puttaswamy, 2017), bodily autonomy, and the right to health. The Court's insistence that reproductive choices fall within 'personal liberty' echoes the logic of Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), where the Supreme Court first explicitly linked reproductive choice to Article 21 for a mentally ill rape survivor.

Critically, the Court rejected the State's adoption argument — establishing a hierarchy where the pregnant person's bodily integrity ranks above third-party welfare solutions. For minors, this carries additional weight because their consent, not a guardian's preference, governs the decision.

The ruling also invokes the harm-avoidance rationale: refusing relief foreseeably causes greater constitutional harm by channeling individuals into dangerous illegal abortions, making judicial denial itself a rights violation.

The Allahabad High Court granted protection to an interfaith couple facing life threats, reaffirming that the right to live together — regardless of religion — falls within Article 21's right to life and personal liberty. The court directed police to ensure their safety. This ruling follows a consistent line of High Court decisions recognising that adult individuals may choose their partner and cohabit without state or societal interference, irrespective of religious differences between them.

This ruling sits at the intersection of Article 19(1)(a) — freedom of expression including the expression of personal choice — and Article 21 — the right to life and personal liberty, which the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy (2017) expanded to include autonomy, dignity, and privacy. The Allahabad HC applied the principle that two consenting adults' right to cohabit cannot be curtailed on grounds of religion, community pressure, or family disapproval.

The foundational precedent is Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018), where the Supreme Court held that the right to choose a life partner is a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21. The court further held that khap panchayats or any assembly that interferes with this right commits a constitutional wrong. Similarly, in Lata Singh v. State of UP (2006), the Supreme Court directed protection for inter-caste and inter-religion couples facing threat.

The limitation the court recognised: the state may regulate marriage through laws like the Special Marriage Act, 1954 — designed precisely for interfaith couples — but it cannot prohibit cohabitation or deny police protection merely because a relationship crosses religious lines. The test applied is proportionality: any restriction on personal liberty under Article 21 must satisfy the threefold test from Maneka Gandhi (1978) — it must be by law, the law must be just, fair, and reasonable, and it must not be arbitrary. Mere disapproval by family or community cannot override fundamental rights.

The Delhi High Court upheld UPSC's August 1 cut-off date for computing age eligibility in the Civil Services Examination, dismissing a challenge that it caused arbitrary exclusions. The court held that fixing a cut-off date involves policy considerations within the executive's domain, and judicial interference is unwarranted unless the rule is manifestly arbitrary. The ruling reinforces the separation of powers principle, limiting Article 14 challenges against recruitment eligibility conditions framed by competent authorities.

This ruling sits at the intersection of Article 14 (equality before law) and the doctrine of separation of powers. The petitioner's core argument was that the August 1 cut-off date for age eligibility in the Civil Services Examination operated arbitrarily, excluding candidates who turned eligible shortly after that date. The Delhi High Court rejected this, applying the well-settled principle that not every classification that causes individual hardship violates Article 14. For a rule to fall foul of Article 14, it must fail the twin test: (1) the classification must have no intelligible differentia, and (2) the differentia must bear no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

The court further held that selecting a cut-off date — even if some other date might be equally defensible — is a matter of executive policy. Courts do not sit as appellate bodies over policy choices. This deference to executive discretion in service matters flows from a long line of Supreme Court precedents including Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981) and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958), which held that the burden lies on the challenger to show that the classification is unreasonable, not merely inconvenient.

The ruling also reinforces the principle, crystallised in cases like Union of India v. Angus (and reiterated in service law contexts), that prescribing eligibility conditions for public employment is an executive function. A candidate has no vested right to a particular cut-off date; the right is only to be treated equally with others similarly situated. For exam purposes, the critical doctrinal takeaway is the difference between an arbitrary classification and an inconvenient but rational one — the examiner will test exactly this distinction.

The Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation (DDWS) has directed States and UTs to integrate works under Jal Jeevan Mission 2.0 with MGNREGS, aiming to reduce duplication of rural infrastructure investment. The convergence focuses on grey water management, soak pits, and watershed development. DDWS argues that pooling labour and material resources across schemes can extend functional household tap connections and achieve long-term water source sustainability in rural areas with minimal additional fiscal outlay.

JJM 2.0 is the continuation of the original Jal Jeevan Mission, which aimed to provide Functional Household Tap Connections (FHTCs) to every rural household by 2024. The original mission covered potable piped water supply; JJM 2.0 expands focus to water quality, sustainability of sources, and grey water treatment.

The convergence directive is a governance mechanism, not a new scheme. DDWS is asking States to deploy MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) labour and permissible works — such as recharge structures, soak pits, and plantation — to complement JJM 2.0 infrastructure. This avoids double expenditure from the Consolidated Fund while creating durable rural assets.

For exam purposes, understand three layers:
1. Institutional: DDWS (under Ministry of Jal Shakti) implements JJM; Ministry of Rural Development implements MGNREGS. Convergence requires inter-ministerial coordination.
2. Financial: MGNREGS funds are demand-driven and wage-linked; JJM funds are tied to infrastructure targets. Pooling them is technically complex but fiscally efficient.
3. Policy problem: Building a tap connection is insufficient if the water source dries up or grey water pollutes the area. Convergence addresses the sustainability gap that FHTCs alone cannot solve.

For NABARD aspirants: rural water infrastructure is a precondition for agricultural productivity and rural credit absorption. A functioning water supply reduces drudgery (especially for women), improves health, and increases rural household disposable income — all of which affect credit repayment capacity and rural demand.