UPSC CSE Current Affairs — 29 July 2026

The Reserve Bank of India's Monetary Policy Committee, chaired by Governor Sanjay Malhotra, unanimously kept the repo rate unchanged at 5.25 percent with a neutral stance in its first bi-monthly meeting of 2025-26. The Standing Deposit Facility rate stands at 5.00 percent and the MSF/Bank Rate at 5.50 percent. RBI projected real GDP growth at 6.9 percent for 2025-26 and estimated 2024-25 GDP at 7.6 percent. CPI inflation for 2025-26 is projected at 4.6 percent.

This MPC decision is significant on multiple fronts. First, the unanimous vote signals MPC cohesion even amid global headwinds — the West Asia conflict and El Niño risks — that could push up energy prices, freight costs, and supply-chain disruptions, all of which feed into domestic inflation and compress growth. The neutral stance, as opposed to 'withdrawal of accommodation,' gives RBI flexibility to pivot either way without signalling an immediate rate hike or cut.

The GDP projection of 6.9 percent for FY26 — down from the 7.6 percent estimated for FY25 — reflects a measured acknowledgement that external shocks are beginning to bite. Yet Governor Malhotra stressed that India's macroeconomic fundamentals are on stronger footing now than in previous shock episodes, implying greater resilience.

On the exchange rate, the RBI reiterated its market-determined framework while reserving the right to intervene to curb excessive volatility — not to defend any specific rupee level. This matters because the rupee depreciated more in 2025-26 than the historical average despite stronger fundamentals, raising concern about imported inflation.

For exam purposes, the key interplay is: unchanged repo rate + neutral stance + downward growth revision + upside inflation risks = a classic 'wait-and-watch' monetary policy calibration. Students must distinguish between the three corridor rates (SDF, repo, MSF) and understand what each signals about RBI's liquidity management posture.

India's Supreme Court is revisiting the doctrine of 'constitutional morality' — a principle central to its landmark 2018 Navtej Singh Johar judgment that decriminalised consensual same-sex relations by striking down Section 377 IPC. The current judicial exercise may determine whether constitutional morality can extend LGBTQ protections further, including rights to marriage, adoption, and non-discrimination. The five-judge Constitution Bench that decided Navtej explicitly elevated constitutional morality over popular morality as a guiding interpretive standard.

Constitutional morality, as articulated by B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly debates, means adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution rather than to the prevailing social consensus. The Supreme Court revived this doctrine in the Navtej Singh Johar case (2018) to hold that criminalising consensual adult same-sex relations violated Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 19 (expression), and 21 (dignity and privacy). The Court drew heavily on Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the nine-judge Privacy Bench ruling, which established privacy as a fundamental right intrinsic to personal liberty under Article 21.

The critical current question is: can constitutional morality now compel the State to affirmatively recognise same-sex marriage or civil unions? In Supriyo v. Union of India (2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench declined to grant the right to same-sex marriage, saying Parliament — not the Court — must legislate. However, it did not foreclose future claims. The dissenting opinion by Justice S.K. Kaul explicitly called for a civil union framework.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the doctrinal scaffolding — constitutional morality vs. popular morality, the Puttaswamy privacy chain, Article 21 expansionism, and the limits of judicial review vis-à-vis parliamentary supremacy — forms the analytical core of likely passage questions. For UPSC, the tension between judicial interpretation and majoritarian democracy, and India's obligations under international human rights law, frame the static hinterland.

The Supreme Court, in a bench led by Justices B V Nagarathna and N K Singh, ruled that no court can compel a woman, especially a minor, to carry a pregnancy against her will. The judgment reinforces reproductive autonomy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ruling emphasises that forcing pregnancy continuation constitutes a violation of bodily integrity and personal liberty, making judicial override of a woman's reproductive choice constitutionally impermissible.

This ruling sits at the intersection of reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, and constitutional jurisprudence — a zone Indian courts have been progressively expanding since the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act was amended in 2021. That amendment raised the gestational limit for abortion to 24 weeks for certain categories of women, including survivors of sexual assault, minors, and women with foetal abnormalities, and effectively recognised that reproductive choice is not a privilege but a right.

The Supreme Court's present ruling goes further by categorically stating that courts themselves cannot override a woman's refusal to continue a pregnancy. This is significant because in several lower court orders — particularly those involving minors who approach courts seeking termination beyond the statutory limit — judges have sometimes conditioned or denied relief in ways that effectively compelled continuation of the pregnancy. The Supreme Court has now closed that interpretive gap.

The constitutional anchor is Article 21, under which the right to life and personal liberty has been expansively read to include the right to health, dignity, and bodily integrity. The ruling also intersects with the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, where pregnancy in a minor is presumptively the result of abuse, making compelled continuation of such pregnancy doubly violative of rights. For UPSC and CLAT examinees, this case matters as a landmark on reproductive autonomy, judicial limits, and Article 21 jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court of India ordered a Special Investigation Team (SIT) probe into violence against student protesters, reaffirming that the right to peaceful protest is protected under Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech). The Court held police accountable for disproportionate force and directed independent investigation. The judgment strengthens constitutional safeguards for dissent, establishing that state suppression of peaceful protest violates fundamental rights.

This judgment sits at the intersection of three constitutional pillars: Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech and expression, Article 19(1)(b) right to peaceful assembly, and Article 21 right to life and personal liberty. Courts in India have progressively interpreted Article 21 expansively — from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) onwards — to include dignity, liberty, and freedom from arbitrary state action. When police deploy disproportionate force against peaceful student protesters, they violate the procedure established by law standard (and, post-Maneka, the just, fair, and reasonable standard). The SIT mechanism is significant: it removes investigation from the very police force accused of excess, ensuring independence. This mirrors the logic behind prior SIT orders in cases like the 2002 Gujarat riots (Zakia Jafri case). The judgment also engages with the doctrine of proportionality — a force must be proportionate to the threat — now firmly embedded in Indian constitutional law via K.S. Puttaswamy (2017). For student protest specifically, courts have historically protected the right to demonstrate: Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012) held that sleeping at a protest site at night is protected. This judgment extends that lineage, making police accountability for protest violence a constitutional mandate, not a policy choice.

A Member of Parliament has filed an Article 32 petition in the Supreme Court challenging the deployment of facial recognition technology (FRT) and biometric surveillance by police at protest sites. The petition raises concerns over violation of fundamental rights including privacy, free speech, and the right to protest. Filed before the Supreme Court of India, the case tests constitutional limits on state surveillance in public spaces and the absence of a dedicated statutory framework governing FRT use by law enforcement.

India has no dedicated legislation governing the use of facial recognition technology by state agencies, a gap that makes this petition constitutionally significant. The police deployment of FRT at protest sites effectively enables mass surveillance of citizens exercising their fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21. The Supreme Court's landmark nine-judge bench ruling in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) unanimously recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, establishing informational privacy and data protection as constitutional entitlements. FRT at protests threatens the chilling effect doctrine: when citizens know they are being biometrically identified, they may self-censor participation in constitutionally protected assembly and speech. The petition, filed under Article 32 — the constitutional remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights — asks the Supreme Court to either restrain the use of FRT or mandate a legislative framework with safeguards. India currently lacks a comprehensive data protection law calibrated to surveillance contexts; the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 largely exempts state agencies for national security and law enforcement purposes. This creates a regulatory vacuum where biometric surveillance by police operates without judicial oversight, algorithmic accountability, or redress mechanisms, raising proportionality concerns central to the Puttaswamy framework.

India hosts nearly 70 percent of the world's wild tiger population, confirmed by the 2022 All India Tiger Estimation. The count stood at 3,682 tigers across 53 Tiger Reserves covering approximately 75,000 sq km under Project Tiger, launched in 1973. India achieved its 2022 doubling target four years early. Conservation integrates camera-trap technology, genetic sampling, and community participation through eco-development committees, making India's model a global benchmark endorsed by IUCN and Global Tiger Forum.

India's tiger conservation success is not accidental — it is the product of a fifty-year policy architecture built on three pillars: legal protection, habitat management, and science-based monitoring. Project Tiger (1973) created the institutional backbone, while the Wildlife Protection Act (1972) gave it teeth. The National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA), constituted under the 2006 amendment to WPA, added statutory oversight and financial accountability.

The 2022 tiger census — conducted using occupancy modelling, camera traps, and DNA analysis across 20 states — is the world's largest camera-trap wildlife survey. The 3,682 figure represents a quadrupling since 1973's estimated 1,827 tigers.

What makes India's model globally replicable is community integration. Eco-Development Committees (EDCs) around buffer zones convert forest-edge communities from poaching threats into conservation partners through livelihood support. Voluntary village relocation from core zones — with compensation packages — has reduced human-wildlife conflict. States like Madhya Pradesh (785 tigers), Karnataka (563), and Uttarakhand (560) demonstrate that high agricultural pressure and high tiger density can coexist with policy design.

For NABARD, the model intersects with watershed development, CAMPA funds, and Joint Forest Management — all financing instruments that NABARD either channels or co-ordinates. Tiger corridor financing increasingly involves NABARD's rural infrastructure lending.

India's Ministry of External Affairs has formally invited Nepal's Prime Minister Balendra Shah to New Delhi to ease border tensions between the two neighbours. The invitation signals diplomatic outreach amid strained bilateral ties, including unresolved disputes over the Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura trifunctional region. India and Nepal share an open border under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Nepal's updated 2020 political map, which incorporated disputed territories, remains a core irritant in the relationship.

India-Nepal relations rest on a unique civilizational and treaty-based foundation, but recent years have seen periodic friction. The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship remains the cornerstone, granting Nepali citizens near-parity rights in India and enabling open border movement. However, Nepal's 2020 constitutional amendment to update its official map — incorporating Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura — escalated tensions significantly. India rejected that map revision as 'artificial enlargement' of Nepal's territory. The Lipulekh pass is strategically vital: India uses it as a key route to Kailash-Mansarovar in Tibet. China's growing footprint in Nepal through BRI infrastructure investment adds a strategic layer, pushing India to sustain diplomatic engagement to prevent Nepal drifting further into Beijing's orbit. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, tasked with revising the 1950 Treaty, has never been formally received by India — a continuing sore point for Kathmandu. Balendra Shah, a popular rapper-turned-politician, became Kathmandu's Mayor before entering national politics, representing a new political generation. His visit, if it materialises, would be significant for stabilising the 'neighbourhood first' policy. UPSC examiners consistently test the static framework — treaty provisions, border geography, and India's neighbourhood policy — using current events as the entry point, not the question's core.

The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), under the Ministry of Finance, released a comprehensive Guidance Note on Crypto-Asset Reporting under the Income-tax Act, 2025. The note clarifies reporting obligations for Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs), including cryptocurrencies and NFTs, covering taxation under Section 115BBH at 30%, the 1% TDS under Section 194S, and disclosure requirements for domestic and foreign crypto holdings under the new framework.

India's crypto taxation framework, introduced via the Finance Act 2022, created a distinct regime for Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs). Section 115BBH imposed a flat 30% tax on VDA transfer gains with no deduction for losses or carry-forward. Section 194S mandated 1% TDS on VDA transfers above specified thresholds. However, operational ambiguities persisted around reporting — particularly for decentralised exchanges, peer-to-peer transactions, and foreign-held crypto assets. The CBDT Guidance Note 2025 addresses these gaps comprehensively. It aligns India's domestic framework with the OECD's Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF), which India is committed to implementing under G20 obligations. CARF requires Reporting Crypto-Asset Service Providers (RCASPs) to collect and exchange user data with tax authorities. The Guidance Note specifies which entities qualify as RCASPs, which asset classes fall under VDA definitions, and how foreign crypto holdings must be disclosed in Schedule FA of ITR. For SEBI, the note has capital-market implications as crypto derivatives and tokenised securities blur boundaries between regulated and unregulated instruments. For RBI, it intersects with CBDC policy and shadow banking concerns about stablecoin adoption. UPSC examinees must understand this as India's move toward formalising the digital asset economy within a statutory tax architecture.

India's income tax return data, tabled in Parliament in 2025-26, reveals that 576 individuals reported gross total income of Rs 100 crore or more, a fourfold rise from approximately 141 such taxpayers five years ago. This surge reflects growing income concentration at the top. The data, sourced from the Income Tax Department, was disclosed in response to a parliamentary query, highlighting widening wealth inequality even as India's formal taxpayer base has expanded significantly.

The fourfold jump in ultra-high-income taxpayers — from roughly 141 to 576 in five years — is a significant data point for understanding India's evolving income distribution. It emerges from ITR filings, meaning it captures only declared income, making the actual wealth concentration likely even sharper. For policymakers and economists, this matters on multiple levels. First, it signals that economic growth has been disproportionately captured by the top of the income pyramid, a pattern corroborated by global inequality reports such as the World Inequality Report, which flagged India as having one of the highest income concentrations among large economies. Second, it raises questions about the adequacy of India's progressive taxation architecture — whether surcharge rates on super-rich incomes, capital gains tax structures, and dividend taxation are effectively redistributive. Third, for the RBI, extreme wealth concentration has macroeconomic implications: it can dampen aggregate consumption (since the ultra-rich have lower marginal propensity to consume), affect credit demand patterns, and influence asset price inflation in real estate and equities. From a fiscal policy angle, this data fuels debates around inheritance tax, wealth tax revival, and whether a higher surcharge bracket is warranted. The UPSC examiner typically uses such data to probe inequality measurement, fiscal federalism, and redistribution mechanisms.