UPSC CSE Current Affairs — 1 October 2026

The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, inserted Part IX-A (Articles 243P–243ZG) and the Twelfth Schedule into the Constitution, granting Urban Local Bodies constitutional status for the first time. Passed by Parliament in December 1992 and enforced from 1 June 1993, it mandated regular elections, SC/ST and women's reservations, State Finance Commissions, and District and Metropolitan Planning Committees. Despite this framework, critics note that states have not adequately devolved functions or finances to municipalities.

Before 1992, urban local bodies operated purely under state municipal statutes, meaning their structure, powers, elections, and finances varied widely and were wholly subject to state discretion. The Constitution placed local government in the State List (Entry 5), offering no protection against prolonged supersession, irregular elections, or financial starvation of municipalities.

The 74th Amendment fundamentally changed this by constitutionalising urban self-government. It added Part IX-A, creating a mandatory three-tier municipal structure: Nagar Panchayat (transitional rural-to-urban areas), Municipal Council (smaller urban areas), and Municipal Corporation (larger urban areas). The Governor determines category based on population, density, revenue, and non-agricultural employment.

Key constitutional guarantees now include: a five-year tenure for municipalities, elections within six months of dissolution, mandatory SC/ST seat reservation proportional to population, a minimum one-third reservation for women (including SC/ST women), and a State Election Commission with independent superintendence over municipal elections.

The Twelfth Schedule lists 18 functions that may be transferred to municipalities — covering urban planning, land use, roads, water supply, public health, education, and poverty alleviation — but the word 'may' is critical: devolution is discretionary, not mandatory, which is the central criticism of the Act.

The State Finance Commission (Article 243Y) reviews municipal finances and recommends revenue sharing, while District Planning Committees (Article 243ZD) and Metropolitan Planning Committees (Article 243ZE) integrate urban and rural planning at district and metro levels respectively. Part IX-A does not automatically apply to Scheduled Areas or the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.

The Delhi High Court dismissed a PIL challenging the government's failure to establish a memorial for the Indian National Army, despite earlier official commitments. The court held that no fundamental right under Articles 14 or 21 of the Constitution is violated when a government fails to honour a policy promise. A government's pledge to build a memorial does not create an enforceable constitutional entitlement that courts can compel through PIL jurisdiction.

This ruling sharpens a critical boundary in PIL jurisprudence: the distinction between a government's policy promise and a constitutionally enforceable fundamental right. The court's reasoning rests on a well-established principle — Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty, and Article 14 guarantees equality before law, but neither provision converts every government commitment into a justiciable right. A memorial is a policy decision within the executive's discretionary domain; courts cannot substitute their judgment for executive inaction on such matters unless a specific legal right is traceable to a statute or constitutional provision.

The PIL route is available to enforce fundamental rights or expose a breach of a constitutional or statutory duty — it is not available to compel the executive to fulfil political or policy promises. This case reinforces the locus standi test for PILs: the petitioner must identify a specific right that has been violated, not merely demonstrate that a government pledge was broken. CLAT PG examiners frequently test this distinction — when is PIL maintainable, and on what grounds can a court refuse to entertain it? The answer here is doctrinal: policy discretion is insulated from PIL challenge unless the decision is arbitrary, discriminatory, or violates a positive statutory duty. The INA memorial case provides a clean, recent example of this principle in action.

The 97th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2011, inserted Article 43B into the Directive Principles and Part IXB into the Constitution, giving co-operative societies constitutional recognition and mandating their autonomous, democratic functioning. However, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021) struck down Part IXB as it applied to multi-state co-operatives, holding that Parliament bypassed the mandatory requirement of ratification by at least half the state legislatures under Article 368(2).

The 97th Amendment made three structural changes to the Constitution. First, it added 'co-operative societies' to Article 19(1)(c), explicitly protecting the right to form co-operative societies as a fundamental right. Second, it inserted Article 43B as a Directive Principle, directing the State to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control, and professional management of co-operatives. Third, and most consequentially, it inserted a new Part IXB (Articles 243ZH to 243ZT) laying down detailed provisions on elections, audit, supersession, and government interference in co-operative societies.

The constitutional crisis arose because co-operative societies fall under Entry 32 of List II (State List). The amendment therefore directly affected the legislative domain of states. Under Article 368(2), any amendment affecting provisions in the State List requires ratification by legislatures of not less than half the states. Parliament passed the 97th Amendment with a special majority but did not send it for state ratification.

In Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court drew a surgical distinction: Part IXB was struck down only insofar as it applied to co-operative societies within the legislative competence of states. However, the court upheld Part IXB's application to multi-state co-operative societies, which fall under Parliament's domain (Entry 44, List I). Article 19(1)(c) amendment and Article 43B were upheld entirely, as they did not attract the state-ratification requirement. This ruling is a landmark on federalism, the amendment procedure, and the limits of Parliament's constituent power when state subjects are involved.

Around ten to twelve companies filed draft red herring prospectuses with SEBI on September 29 and 30, signalling sustained primary market momentum heading into the fourth quarter. The filings span sectors including manufacturing, services, and technology. Companies file DRHPs to seek SEBI approval before launching public share sales. SEBI typically has thirty working days to issue observations on a DRHP, after which the company has twelve months to proceed with the offering.

An Initial Public Offering is the process by which a private company raises capital from the public by issuing shares listed on a recognized stock exchange. In India, the process is governed by SEBI's Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements (ICDR) Regulations, 2018.

The journey begins when a company files a Draft Red Herring Prospectus (DRHP) with SEBI. The DRHP contains detailed disclosures about the company's financials, risk factors, objects of the issue (how proceeds will be used), and the promoter background. SEBI scrutinizes the document and issues its 'observations' — essentially a clearance letter — within 30 working days for book-built issues.

Once SEBI observations are received, the company has a 12-month validity window to open the IPO. The final offer price and issue size are disclosed in the Red Herring Prospectus (RHP) filed just before the issue opens.

IPOs can involve a fresh issue of shares (company gets the money) or an offer for sale (existing shareholders sell their stake; company gets nothing). Many Indian IPOs combine both. SEBI mandates minimum public shareholding of 25% post-listing for most companies.

The primary market — where securities are first sold to investors — is distinct from the secondary market where listed shares are subsequently traded. Sustained DRHP filing activity is a leading indicator of primary market health and investor confidence in equity valuations.

Journalist Ajit Anjum has filed an intervention application before the Supreme Court in a pending case concerning the scope and interpretation of legislative privileges under the Indian Constitution. The case examines how far parliamentary privilege extends — particularly whether it shields legislators from judicial scrutiny for actions taken inside the legislature. The intervention signals broader public interest in resolving the tension between parliamentary immunity and constitutional rights of citizens and press freedom.

Legislative privileges are special rights, immunities, and powers enjoyed by Parliament and state legislatures, and their members, to ensure they can function independently without external interference. Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution govern these privileges for Parliament and state legislatures respectively.

The core tension the Supreme Court is being asked to resolve is this: how absolute is parliamentary privilege? Earlier, in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), a majority held that legislators cannot be prosecuted for bribery related to votes cast inside the House — an expansive reading of privilege. The court in Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) overruled this, holding that privilege does not extend to bribery, because the corrupt act precedes the parliamentary act.

The pending case likely concerns where the outer boundary of privilege lies — whether courts can review legislative proceedings, whether privilege can be used to gag the press or citizens, and whether fundamental rights can be curtailed in the name of legislative immunity.

A journalist intervening is significant: it raises the question of whether privilege can be weaponised against press coverage of legislative conduct. The examiner will test whether aspirants understand the difference between privilege that protects legislative independence (legitimate) and privilege used to suppress accountability (constitutionally suspect). The distinction between Articles 105(1), 105(2), and 105(3) — and the role of codification — is a core testable area.