CLAT PG Current Affairs — 1 August 2026

The Supreme Court on July 30 directed all States and Union Territories to constitute a Board of Visitors in every district for prison oversight. This statutory mechanism, provided under the Prisons Act 1894 and Model Prison Manual, requires both official and non-official visitors to inspect jails, check conditions, and report on prisoner welfare. The Court's order operationalises a long-dormant oversight structure to address systemic failures in custodial accountability across Indian prisons.

The Board of Visitors is a statutory oversight mechanism under the Prisons Act, 1894. Section 6 of the Act mandates the appointment of Visitors for every prison. Visitors are classified into two categories: Official Visitors (magistrates, judges, civil surgeons) and Non-Official Visitors (appointed by the State Government, often social workers or advocates). Their function is to inspect prisons periodically, examine prison registers, hear prisoner complaints, and submit reports to the State Government. Despite being part of the 1894 Act for over a century, this mechanism has been dormant in most States.

The Supreme Court's July 30 order activates this mechanism as a constitutional imperative, linking prison oversight to Articles 14 (equality), 19, and 21 (right to life and dignity). The Court draws on its expanded prison jurisprudence from cases like Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978), Charles Sobhraj v. Superintendent (1978), and Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (suo motu). The Model Prison Manual 2016, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, also prescribes BoVs but compliance has been poor.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the exam-relevant intersection is the statutory basis (Prisons Act 1894, Section 6), the constitutional anchor (Article 21), and the landmark precedents that frame prisoners' rights. The examiner will likely present a hypothetical where a prisoner is denied visits or inspection, testing whether the aspirant identifies the correct statutory and constitutional remedy.

The Supreme Court ruled that witness testimony recorded during trial against one accused cannot be used against a co-accused who had absconded, unless a specific order under Section 299 CrPC was passed before recording such evidence. The court clarified that mere abscondence does not automatically attract S.299 protections. A deliberate judicial order designating the accused as an absconder and directing evidence to be recorded in their absence is a mandatory procedural prerequisite for such evidence to be later admissible against them.

Section 299 CrPC (now mirrored under BNSS) creates a narrow exception to the fundamental right of an accused to be present during trial and cross-examine witnesses. Ordinarily, evidence recorded in the absence of an accused is inadmissible against them — this flows from the principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution.

S.299 permits a court to record evidence against an absconder if: (1) a warrant has been issued, (2) the accused cannot be found, and (3) a specific judicial order is passed directing that evidence be recorded in their absence. This evidence, once recorded under a valid S.299 order, can later be used against the accused when they are eventually apprehended and face trial.

The Supreme Court's ruling tightens this framework significantly: courts cannot retrospectively validate evidence by invoking S.299. The order must precede the recording of evidence. If evidence was recorded without such an order — even if the accused was factually absconding — it cannot be used against them later.

This matters because the examiner will distinguish between the factual state of abscondence and the legal procedural requirement. A co-accused who was simply absent but not formally designated under a S.299 order retains full evidentiary protections. This is the classic CLAT PG trap: equating factual absence with legal abscondence.

The Supreme Court held that interim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC can be denied to a wife if the husband produces prima facie evidence of her adulterous relationship. The court clarified that at the interim stage, the judge need not conduct a full trial but must apply judicial mind to the material placed on record. If the husband demonstrates ex facie that the wife is living in adultery, the court has discretion to refuse interim maintenance pending final adjudication.

Section 125 CrPC (now mirrored in Section 144 BNSS 2023) provides maintenance to wives, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. However, Section 125(4) CrPC creates a statutory bar: a wife living in adultery, or who without sufficient reason refuses to live with her husband, or who is living separately by mutual consent, is NOT entitled to maintenance.

The critical distinction this ruling makes is between interim and final maintenance. Courts had historically been reluctant to deny interim maintenance without a full trial on the adultery allegation. This Supreme Court ruling shifts that position: even at the interim stage, if the husband places material on record that ex facie (on the face of it) demonstrates an adulterous relationship, the court can exercise its discretion to deny interim maintenance. 'Ex facie' means on first appearance — without a deep evidentiary inquiry.

This is significant because interim maintenance is often the more practically impactful relief — it operates during the pendency of the case, sometimes for years. The ruling thus balances two competing interests: the wife's right to financial support during litigation and the court's duty not to reward conduct that the statute expressly penalises.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will likely test the exact statutory bar (Section 125(4)), the meaning of 'ex facie', and the judicial discretion standard at the interim stage. BNSS equivalent is the key satellite fact.

The Supreme Court struck down Bihar's compassionate appointment policy that restricted married daughters from seeking the benefit, allowing it only to daughters who were divorced or deserted. The Court held this distinction unconstitutional, ruling it violated the right to equality. Compassionate appointment schemes exist to provide immediate employment to a family member upon a government employee's death or permanent incapacitation, to relieve sudden financial distress. Conditioning eligibility on marital status of daughters was held to be discriminatory and gender-stereotyped.

Compassionate appointment is a welfare measure, not a right — it allows a dependent family member to receive government employment on humanitarian grounds when a serving employee dies in harness or is permanently incapacitated. The scheme is an exception to the normal recruitment process and is governed by service rules framed by each state.

The Bihar policy created a classification among daughters based on marital status: unmarried daughters were eligible, divorced or deserted daughters were eligible, but married daughters were excluded. The implicit assumption was that a married daughter has a husband to depend on and therefore does not need the compassionate benefit.

The Supreme Court's ruling attacks this assumption directly. It applies the standard equality test under Article 14 — a classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that bears a rational nexus to the object of the legislation. The object of compassionate appointment is to relieve sudden financial hardship to a dependent family member. A married daughter can be financially dependent on her parents and can suffer equal hardship upon their death. Marital status, by itself, does not determine financial dependence.

The deeper constitutional principle invoked is judicial gender stereotyping — the Court has consistently held (beginning with Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya and continuing through Joseph Shine) that policies premised on the assumption that a woman derives economic security from a male partner are constitutionally impermissible. This ruling extends that principle into service law, making it a significant precedent for CLAT PG.