CLAT PG Current Affairs — 1 September 2026

The Supreme Court ruled that an informant's consent is not required when quashing a criminal case under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) based on a settlement between the accused and the actual victim. The Court drew a clear distinction between the informant who lodges the FIR and the person who actually suffered the offence. Where the real victim has settled, the informant's objection cannot block quashing, as the victim's autonomy and the ends of justice prevail.

This ruling sharpens a critical distinction in quashing jurisprudence under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS). Courts have inherent power to quash FIRs to secure the ends of justice, but this power is exercised carefully in cases involving serious versus compoundable offences.

The central principle here is: the informant and the victim are legally distinct persons. An informant is merely the person who sets the criminal law in motion by lodging an FIR — they need not be the one who suffered the harm. The victim is the person against whom the offence was actually committed. When these two roles vest in different people, it is the victim's consent to settlement that carries legal weight for quashing purposes, not the informant's.

The Court's reasoning flows from the purpose of criminal law itself. In primarily private disputes — matrimonial offences, cheating between individuals, hurt — the rationale for continuing prosecution weakens when the injured party has been made whole through settlement. The informant's refusal to consent in such cases is legally irrelevant because the informant has no independent stake in the injury.

This principle connects to the landmark ruling in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), where the Supreme Court laid down the framework for quashing FIRs in non-compoundable but essentially private offences. It also intersects with Section 320 CrPC (compounding of offences) — but quashing under Section 482 can go further, covering offences not listed under Section 320.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will test whether aspirants can correctly identify who qualifies as the 'victim' for quashing purposes and whether the informant's objection is a legal bar.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a High Court can issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 to quash a tribunal decision that is grossly perverse — meaning one that no reasonable person could have reached on the facts and law available. The Court distinguished this ground from a mere error within jurisdiction, clarifying that perversity so extreme as to shock judicial conscience crosses into an error of jurisdiction and thus falls within the High Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction.

Certiorari is a writ by which a superior court calls up the record of a proceeding before a lower court or tribunal to examine whether it has acted within its jurisdiction, followed the principles of natural justice, and not committed an error apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226, High Courts have broader certiorari powers than the Supreme Court under Article 32, because Article 226 is not confined to fundamental rights enforcement — it extends to 'any other purpose.'

The classic English law position, adopted in India through Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (1955), holds that certiorari lies for: (1) want of jurisdiction, (2) excess of jurisdiction, (3) error of law apparent on the face of the record, and (4) breach of natural justice. 'Gross perversity' was later recognised as a sub-category — where a finding is so irrational that it effectively amounts to an excess or abuse of jurisdiction.

The critical distinction the Court is drawing in this ruling is between a mere wrong decision (which is not open to certiorari because an error within jurisdiction does not oust jurisdiction) and a decision so perverse that no tribunal acting reasonably could have reached it. The latter collapses into jurisdictional error, making certiorari available.

This doctrine connects to the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard in administrative law and aligns with the Supreme Court's consistent position in cases like Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003), where it held that High Courts may use Article 226/227 to correct a palpably erroneous or perverse subordinate court/tribunal order. The ruling thus reinforces that judicial review of tribunals, while limited, is not excluded when the decision shocks the judicial conscience.

The Supreme Court has cautioned High Courts against routinely staying criminal trials by mechanically invoking their revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC (Section 442 BNSS). The Court held that stays on trial proceedings should be an exception, not a norm, and must be justified by exceptional circumstances. Granting such stays without applying judicial mind defeats the constitutional mandate of speedy trial under Article 21 and causes prolonged hardship to complainants and witnesses waiting for justice.

This ruling engages two intersecting doctrines in criminal procedure: the scope of revisional jurisdiction and the right to a speedy trial.

Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC (now Section 442 BNSS) allows the High Court or Sessions Court to call for and examine the record of any inferior court to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality, or propriety of a finding, sentence, or order. It is a supervisory, not appellate, power. The critical distinction is that revision does not automatically carry a right to stay proceedings — a stay is a discretionary equitable relief that must be earned.

The Supreme Court's concern is 'mechanical invocation' — High Courts issuing stay orders almost as a matter of course whenever a revision petition is filed, without examining whether exceptional circumstances exist. This converts a supervisory remedy into a delaying tactic. In Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of UP (2012), the Supreme Court had already flagged the pendency crisis arising from such stays.

The constitutional anchor is Article 21: the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to a speedy trial (Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, 1979). A mechanically-granted stay of trial violates this right not just of the accused, but also of the victim and witnesses.

For CLAT PG, the examiner will test whether you can distinguish revisional jurisdiction from appellate jurisdiction, identify when a stay of trial is permissible, and apply the speedy trial doctrine to a new fact pattern.

The Supreme Court has declined to reconsider its settled position that judges appointed directly to Family Courts under the Family Courts Act, 1984 are ineligible for elevation to a High Court. The ruling reaffirms that Family Court judges are not District Judges within the meaning of Article 233 of the Constitution, and therefore fall outside the channel through which district-level judges are elevated. The court refused to treat the petition as an occasion to revisit the precedent on judicial appointments.

At the heart of this ruling is Article 233 of the Constitution, which governs appointments of District Judges. Only two categories are eligible for elevation to the High Court through this route: advocates with seven years' standing, and persons already in judicial service of the Union or State. The critical question is whether a Family Court judge belongs to the 'judicial service' in the constitutional sense.

The Family Courts Act, 1984 created a specialised forum for matrimonial and family disputes. Judges appointed under this Act are not appointed through the regular State Judicial Service channel — they are appointed by the State Government in consultation with the High Court under Section 4 of the Act, and crucially, they need not be members of the regular subordinate judiciary. The Supreme Court has held that because Family Court judges do not form part of the regular 'District Judge' cadre, they cannot be considered for elevation under Article 233(2).

This ruling is significant for two inter-related reasons. First, it draws a sharp distinction between specialised tribunal/court appointments and mainstream judicial service. Second, it reinforces the principle that constitutional eligibility criteria for judicial appointments are strict and cannot be expanded by executive or collegium discretion alone. The refusal to revisit the precedent signals judicial conservatism in protecting the constitutional appointment architecture — a concept examiners frequently test through Article 233 and 234 distinctions.