CLAT PG Current Affairs — 16 September 2026

The Supreme Court is examining a constitutional conflict between Article 21A, which guarantees free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen, and Article 30, which protects minority communities' right to establish and administer educational institutions. The RTE Act explicitly exempts minority institutions from its provisions. The Court is weighing whether this exemption unconstitutionally denies children in minority-run schools the fundamental right to free education, raising questions about competing constitutional guarantees and child rights.

This dispute sits at the intersection of three constitutional provisions. Article 21A, inserted by the 86th Constitutional Amendment in 2002, makes free and compulsory education a fundamental right for children aged 6–14. The Right to Education Act 2009 operationalises this right but contains a critical carve-out: Section 1(4) and Section 1(5) exempt minority institutions (both linguistic and religious) as well as Vedic pathshalas and madrasas imparting religious instruction.

Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002) and P.A. Inamdar (2005) held that this right is near-absolute for unaided minority institutions, and that the State cannot impose regulations that destroy its minority character.

The constitutional tension: if the RTE Act's norms — secular curriculum, trained teachers, infrastructure standards — are imposed on minority institutions, they arguably erode the Article 30 right. But if the exemption stands entirely, children attending those institutions are denied their Article 21A right.

The Court must determine whether Article 30 shields minority institutions from child-rights legislation, or whether Article 21A, being a fundamental right of the child rather than the institution, must prevail. The proportionality test — whether the exemption is the least restrictive means of protecting minority rights — is likely the analytical framework the bench will apply.

The Delhi High Court granted bail to Mohammad Saqib, an alleged member of a pro-Islamic State terror module, after he had spent approximately eight years in custody under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The court considered evidence recorded after the trial court had rejected his bail application, concluding that remitting him to file a fresh bail application at the trial court level would be unjust given the circumstances and prolonged incarceration.

This case sits at the intersection of UAPA's stringent bail conditions and the constitutional right to personal liberty under Article 21. Under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, bail cannot be granted if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or report, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true. This is a significantly higher threshold than ordinary bail under CrPC Section 437 or 439 (now BNSS Sections 480 and 483).

The Supreme Court in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) held that at the bail stage under UAPA, courts cannot hold a mini-trial or weigh evidence meticulously — the standard is a broad probabilistic view of the material on record. However, the Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) clarified that even under special statutes like UAPA, prolonged incarceration that violates Article 21 can justify bail, and statutory restrictions do not completely override constitutional rights.

The Delhi HC's reasoning here — that evidence recorded after the trial court's bail rejection should be freshly considered at the appellate stage rather than forcing a remand — reflects the principle that appellate courts can exercise original bail jurisdiction when remand would cause further injustice. This is the doctrinal tension CLAT PG loves to test: the interplay between statutory restrictions on bail under special laws and the residual constitutional power of superior courts.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act cannot obstruct bail when an undertrial or convict is medically unfit and cannot be adequately treated in custody. The petitioner, Davinder Singh Nirwal Dev, had sought bail on medical grounds for the second time. The court ruled that humane treatment and the right to health override the statute's stringent bail restrictions in cases of serious medical incapacity.

Section 45 of the PMLA imposes twin conditions before bail can be granted in money-laundering cases: first, the public prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and second, the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit any offence while on bail. These conditions are among the strictest in Indian criminal law and were upheld by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022).

However, courts have consistently recognised that statutory rigour cannot override fundamental rights, particularly the right to life under Article 21, which includes the right to health and dignified treatment. The Punjab and Haryana HC's ruling in Davinder Singh Nirwal Dev crystallises this position: where a convict or undertrial suffers from a serious ailment that cannot be adequately managed within prison facilities, the twin conditions of Section 45 PMLA cannot serve as an absolute bar to bail.

This is not an abandonment of Section 45 — the court is not saying bail should be freely granted in PMLA cases. Rather, it carves a narrow, well-established exception rooted in Article 21. The principle connects to the broader doctrine that no statute, however stringent, can override constitutional guarantees. For CLAT PG purposes, this ruling sits at the intersection of PMLA bail law, Article 21 jurisprudence, and the judicial power to grant bail on humanitarian grounds despite special legislation.

The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on two structural questions about the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: whether it can function as a single-member bench, and whether it must include a judicial member. The authority exercises quasi-judicial powers to confirm or revoke attachments of proceeds of crime. The bench heard arguments on whether its composition, as currently practised, satisfies constitutional requirements of fair adjudication and judicial oversight.

The PMLA Adjudicating Authority is the body that decides whether provisional attachment of property — ordered by the Enforcement Directorate — should be confirmed. Under Section 8 of PMLA, the Authority must adjudicate within 180 days. This is not a criminal court but a quasi-judicial tribunal with serious civil consequences: it can permanently freeze and eventually forfeit property worth crores.

The constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court raises two related but distinct issues. First, can a single-member bench of the Authority validly adjudicate, or does the statute require a multi-member composition? Second, must at least one member be a judicial member — that is, someone with judicial training or experience — as opposed to a bureaucrat or executive appointee?

This connects to a broader principle the Supreme Court has developed across several cases: where a tribunal exercises powers that directly affect life, liberty, or property, the constitution of that tribunal must satisfy minimum standards of independence. The landmark ruling in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down the Tribunal Reforms Act provisions that curtailed judicial independence in tribunals. Similarly, in Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019), the Court held that the composition of tribunals cannot be left entirely to executive discretion.

For PMLA specifically, the stakes are high because the Act already shifts the burden of proof onto the accused (Section 24), and the Adjudicating Authority is the first institutional check on ED's attachment power. If the Authority lacks judicial character, the entire attachment mechanism becomes constitutionally suspect.

For CLAT PG aspirants, the key principle is that quasi-judicial tribunals affecting property rights must have an independent and judicially trained composition — this is not just a statutory question but a constitutional one rooted in Articles 14 and 21.

The Supreme Court held that the successor of a Mathadhipathi (head of a religious mutt) can pursue execution proceedings for a decree obtained by the predecessor. In the Kashi Mutt dispute, the Court recognised that rights and liabilities of a mutt's head pass to the successor, allowing the legal heir of the religious office to enforce court orders already obtained. This affirms the continuity of institutional legal personality in Hindu religious mathas.

This ruling touches a doctrinal intersection between succession law, institutional legal personality, and the law of civil procedure — all areas the CLAT PG examiner draws from.

A 'mutt' (or math) is a Hindu religious institution headed by a Mathadhipathi. Unlike a natural person, the office of Mathadhipathi is a juristic or quasi-juristic position — when one head dies or vacates, the office continues in the successor. The core question here was: can a successor enforce a decree (court order) that the previous head had obtained in litigation?

Under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, execution proceedings can be initiated by the decree-holder or their legal representative. The Supreme Court extended this principle to religious office-holders, recognising that a mutt is an institution with continuity of identity independent of the individual at its helm.

This connects to the doctrine of legal personality of religious and charitable institutions — a concept examined in both contract law (capacity to contract) and succession law (who inherits rights under an institution). The ruling also reinforces that institutional rights do not extinguish with the death of the individual officer; they vest in the successor to the office.

For CLAT PG, this matters because the examiner tests whether aspirants can distinguish between personal rights (which may lapse on death) and institutional or office-held rights (which transfer to successors). The distinction is subtle but testable.