CLAT PG Current Affairs — 7 November 2026

The Supreme Court has ruled that the National Book Trust qualifies as 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution because the central government exercises deep and pervasive control over it. This means NBT employees and individuals aggrieved by its decisions can now directly enforce fundamental rights against it through writ petitions. The Delhi High Court had previously taken a contrary view, which the Supreme Court has now overturned in this ruling.

Article 12 of the Constitution defines 'State' for the purpose of Part III (Fundamental Rights). It expressly includes the Government of India, Parliament, state governments, legislatures, and 'other authorities' within Indian territory or under government control. The phrase 'other authorities' has been judicially expanded over decades through a series of landmark rulings.

The evolution runs as follows: In Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal (1967), the Supreme Court held that 'other authorities' includes statutory bodies exercising governmental functions. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram (1975), statutory corporations like ONGC, LIC, and IFC were held to be 'State.' The critical test crystallised in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981), where a six-factor test was laid down — now the standard framework — asking whether: (1) the entire share capital is held by government; (2) financial assistance from the State meets almost all expenditure; (3) the body enjoys a monopoly status conferred by the State; (4) a deep and pervasive State control exists; (5) the functions discharged are of a public importance; (6) a government department has been transferred to the body.

The NBT is a trust established by the Ministry of Education. It is not a statutory corporation, but the Court applied the Ajay Hasia test and found that government funding, governmental appointment of its chairman and governing body, and State supervision of its objectives satisfied the 'deep and pervasive control' criterion. This overrules the Delhi HC and confirms that even non-statutory bodies can be 'State' if governmental control is structural and not merely incidental.

The Supreme Court directed Punjab and Haryana to supply approximately 11,973 million units of electricity to Himachal Pradesh, intervening in an interstate energy dispute. The order enforces Himachal Pradesh's entitlement to power, likely arising from hydroelectric projects located within its territory but whose output is shared among northern states under historical agreements. The Court's directive underscores judicial enforcement of interstate resource-sharing obligations rooted in constitutional and statutory frameworks governing water and power allocation.

This dispute sits at the intersection of constitutional federalism, interstate resource rights, and the judicial enforcement of statutory entitlements. Electricity generated from hydroelectric projects in Himachal Pradesh is typically shared among beneficiary states — Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Delhi, and Himachal Pradesh — under agreements framed after the reorganisation of Punjab in 1966 under the Punjab Reorganisation Act. Himachal Pradesh's share ('free power' and allocated units) is a legal entitlement, not a discretionary benefit.

Constitutionally, Entry 17 of the State List (water, water courses) and Entry 38 of the Concurrent List (electricity) govern this domain. The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, and the Electricity Act, 2003, provide the statutory backbone. When states default on supply obligations, Article 32 or Article 136 petitions before the Supreme Court become the enforcement route — which is precisely what this order represents.

For CLAT PG, the critical doctrinal point is that the Court's power to direct compliance flows from its jurisdiction to enforce constitutional and statutory rights, not from any original power over electricity policy. The 'right' being enforced here is Himachal Pradesh's vested entitlement under an agreed framework — analogous to property rights under Article 300A, where deprivation requires legal authority. Punjab and Haryana's withholding of supply, absent legal justification, amounts to a denial of that entitlement, triggering judicial correction.

The Supreme Court is examining whether the government can cite unclear departmental rules — rules of its own making — to avoid implementing a court judgment on OBC creamy layer exclusions. The dispute centres on whether bureaucratic self-created ambiguity can legally shield the executive from contempt or compliance obligations. The Court's scrutiny raises a foundational constitutional question: when the state is both the rule-maker and the rule-breaker, does uncertainty it generated excuse non-compliance with a binding judicial order?

This dispute sits at the intersection of three constitutional doctrines that CLAT PG examiners test repeatedly.

First, the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial supremacy in interpreting the Constitution. Under Article 141, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts and authorities. Under Article 144, all civil and judicial authorities must act in aid of the Supreme Court. The executive cannot plead its own administrative confusion to escape Article 144 obligations.

Second, the OBC creamy layer doctrine itself. In Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court held that the more affluent and advanced sections among OBCs — the 'creamy layer' — must be excluded from reservation benefits. The government is constitutionally obligated to identify and exclude this layer. Any dilution through administrative inaction is not a neutral act; it is itself a constitutional violation.

Third, the estoppel-by-conduct principle applied to the State. When the government itself drafts ambiguous rules and then pleads that ambiguity to avoid compliance, courts have consistently held that the State cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously. The rule-maker cannot weaponise its own drafting failure.

For CLAT PG, the core test is: does executive uncertainty — even genuine uncertainty — constitute a legally cognisable defence against contempt of court? The answer from constitutional jurisprudence is no. Wilful disobedience does not require malice; passive non-compliance dressed as administrative confusion suffices for contempt.

The Supreme Court on November 6 dismissed a petition challenging senior advocate designations granted by the Allahabad High Court in 2019. The plea questioned the validity of the designation process. By dismissing the challenge, the Supreme Court effectively affirmed that the Allahabad High Court's exercise of its power to designate senior advocates under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 was not legally infirm. The designations, conferred six years ago, now stand unchallenged.

Senior advocate designation is governed by Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which creates a two-tier bar: advocates and senior advocates. A High Court or the Supreme Court may designate an advocate as 'senior' if it is of the opinion that by virtue of ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge or experience in law, the advocate deserves such distinction. The process and its fairness were extensively examined by the Supreme Court in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017), where the Court held that designation must follow a transparent, objective procedure involving a Permanent Committee, a secretariat, and a point-based assessment system — moving away from pure judicial discretion. The 2017 judgment required High Courts to frame rules consistent with these guidelines. Challenges to designation processes typically arise when candidates allege arbitrariness, non-transparency, or violation of the Indira Jaising framework. When the Supreme Court dismisses such a challenge, it signals that the High Court's process, as scrutinised, did not violate constitutional or statutory standards. For CLAT PG aspirants, the key doctrinal points are: (1) the source of the designation power — Section 16, Advocates Act; (2) the constitutional underpinning — Article 145 for SC, Letters Patent/High Court rules for HCs; and (3) the Indira Jaising procedural framework as the controlling precedent for transparency in designations.